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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ROLE OF THE AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIR IN THE FINANCIAL REPORTING 
PROCESS 
by 
Izhar Haq 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Dasaratha Rama, Co-Major Professor 
Professor Kannan Raghunandan, Co-Major Professor 
In my dissertation, I examine the role of the audit committee chair in the financial 
reporting process and test if the change in audit committee chair is associated with 
changes in audit fees, audit report lag, and audit quality.  Motivation for this dissertation 
comes from the increased attention paid by legislators and regulators in recent years on 
the role of the audit committee in the financial reporting process. While prior studies 
have examined diverse issues related to the composition of the audit committee, no prior 
study has examined the role of the audit committee chair on the oversight of financial 
reporting, even though the chair of the committee has significant control over the 
functioning of the committee. 
 In the first essay of my dissertation, I show that audit fees are higher in firms that 
have a change in the audit committee chair. In the second essay, I examine the 
association between changes in the audit committee chair and audit report lag. In a 
changes regression, I find that the change in audit committee is associated with higher 
audit report lag.  The third essay examines the association between changes in audit 
 vii
committee chair and two different measures of audit quality: restatements and abnormal 
accruals.  There is no evidence in support of the argument that changes in audit 
committee chair is associated with higher quality financial reporting. Overall, the results 
suggest that the change in audit committee chair has an important impact on the financial 
reporting process of public companies. 
  
 viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER PAGE  
I. INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………….…….…1 
II. AUDIT CHAIR CHANGE AND AUDIT FEE ………………….…...……..…..…  7 
Motivation ………….………………………………………………………..…….. 7 
Background ………..………………………………………………………..……… 7 
Prior Research ……………………………………………………………..……… 18 
Research Question …...…………………………………………………………….27 
Method ………………...………………………………………………………….. 28 
Sample ………………………………...……………………………….……..…… 30 
Results …………………………...………………………………….………….…. 31 
Summary ……………………………………………………………….…….…… 33  
 
III. AUDIT CHAIR CHANGE AND AUDIT REPORT LAGS ………..……….....… 34 
Motivation ………………………………………………………………….…….. 34 
Background ………………..……………………………………………………… 34 
Prior Research …………………………………………………………………….. 36  
Research Question ……………………..…………………………………………. 45 
Method …………………………...……………………………………………….. 46 
Sample ………………………………………………………………………..…… 48 
Results ……………………………..……………………………………….….…. 48 
Summary ……………………………………………………………….…….…… 50 
  
IV. AUDIT CHAIR CHANGE AND AUDIT QUALITY ……………………..…..… 51 
Motivation ………………………….…………………………….……………….. 51 
Background ……………………..………………………………………………… 51 
Prior Research …………………………………………………………………….. 52  
Research Question …………………………………..……………………….…… 57 
Method ………………………………...…………………………………..……… 58 
Sample ………………………..……………………………………………..……. 60 
Results ………………………..…………………………………………………… 60 
Summary ……………………………………………………………………..…… 62 
   
V. CONCLUSION …………………..………..…………………………………..…. 63 
LIST OF REFERENCES ………………………………..………………………….…. 82 
VITA ……………………………………………..………………………………….… 91 
 
 
 ix
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE PAGE 
1.  Sample Selection …………………………………………………………………. 66 
2. Descriptive Statistics for the Audit Fee Models ………………………………….. 67 
3. Regression Results for the Audit Fee Models ……………………………………. 69 
4. Descriptive Statistics for the Audit Report Lag Models ………………………... 70 
5. Regression Results for the Audit Report Lag Models ………………………….. 72 
6. Descriptive Statistics for the Audit Report Lag Changes Model …………………. 73 
7. Regression Results for the Audit Report Lag Changes Model …………………… 75 
8. Descriptive Statistics for the Restatements Models ………………………………. 76 
9. Logistic Regression Results for the Restatement Models …………………………77 
10. Descriptive Statistics for Performance Matched Accruals Models ……………… 78 
11. Regression Results for Performance Matched Total Accruals Models ………….. 80 
12. Regression Results for Performance Matched Working Capital Accruals Models  81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In publicly traded companies the audit committee is responsible for the selection 
of the external audit firm, receipt of results from both internal and external audits, and the 
oversight of the financial reporting process including disagreements between 
management and the external auditors.  Oversight of the financial reporting process is 
perhaps the most important function of the audit committee and has received significant 
attention in recent years from both media and regulatory bodies, primarily due to the 
spectacular failures (such as, Enron and WorldCom) that have taken place.  The financial 
reporting process oversight can be quite complex as it entails not only the review of 
quarterly and annual financial statements, but also ensuring that accounting estimates and 
implementation of accounting principles are reasonable.  This typically requires audit 
committees to discuss complex accounting issues and discussions with external auditors 
to address any disagreements by the external auditors on management’s selection of 
accounting principles and accounting adjustments.  Audit committees are also responsible 
for reviewing any fraud or illegal acts committed by management that was identified by 
external auditors as part of the financial audit.   
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) first encouraged the 
concept of the audit committee in 1940 as a result of the McKesson case, it was not until 
the 1970’s that audit committees became common in U.S. corporations (AICPA, 1978).  
In 1972 the Securities and Exchange Commission issued Accounting Series Release No. 
123, in which it reiterated its interest in publicly traded companies establishing audit 
committees and that those committees should be composed of independent directors.  In 
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1977, at the urging of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York Stock 
Exchange adopted a listing requirement that all companies listed in the New York Stock 
Exchange establish a standing audit committee.  In 1977, the board of directors of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) also supported the 
establishment of audit committees and strongly urged members to support the idea.  The 
AICPA also called on all the stock exchanges in the United States to adopt audit 
committee requirements similar to the New York Stock Exchange.  In subsequent years, 
the SEC and General Accounting Office continued to push for the formation of effective 
audit committees. 
While audit committees were becoming more common in publicly traded 
companies during the 1970s and 1980s, there were no established standards for the 
composition and responsibility of the committee.  As a result of concerns raised by SEC 
Chair Arthur Levitt regarding the adequacy of oversight by audit committees, the Blue 
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees 
(which was composed of individuals from the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, 
CPA firms, and public companies) was established in 1998 and in 1999 issued 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of audit committees. In 1999, all the major 
exchanges adopted a number of Blue Ribbon Committee recommendations.   
After the Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) in 2002.  Section 301 of SOX requires the SEC to establish rules prohibiting 
the listing of companies that are not in compliance with standards established for audit 
committees.  The standards included direct responsibility for the appointment, 
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compensation, and oversight of the outside auditors.  Also, under SOX each member of 
the audit committee of publicly traded companies must be independent.  
Given that standardized best practices for audit committees has only been around 
for about a decade, it’s not surprising that accounting research into audit committees does 
not go much further back than 1996.  Audit committee effectiveness can be assessed 
along the following four dimensions: Composition, Authority, Resources, and Diligence 
(DeZoort et al.2002).  Prior research has concentrated on composition and diligence 
because they are the features about which data are publicly available. Much of the prior 
research on audit committee composition had focused on issues such as independence 
and financial expertise of the audit committee members.  More recent studies have started 
to examine other issues related to composition, such as tenure and “busy boarding” by 
audit committee members (Sharma and Iselin 2011; Barua et al.2010). 
One issue that has not received any attention in prior research is the role of the 
audit committee chair.  This is surprising, given the extensive focus on the role of the 
board of directors chair in governance research.  Many prior studies have examined 
issues related to the role of the chair of the board of directors on the effectiveness of the 
monitoring by the board of directors.  For example, many studies have examined issues 
related to the separation of the roles of the chair of the board of directors and the CEO. 
Carcello, Hermanson and Ye (2011, 32) note, in their extensive review of audit 
committees, that: 
“Extant research frequently considers the role of the board chair in the 
governance process, including examining when it is optimal to combine 
the roles of board chair and CEO as well as examining the relative 
monitoring effectiveness of separating these positions versus combining 
them. However, very little research separately examines the role of the 
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audit committee chair in facilitating effective audit committee 
performance (Bédard and Gendron 2010). Given the role of the audit 
committee chair in driving the agenda, the meeting packet, the conduct of 
the meeting, and interactions between meetings, this is an unfortunate 
oversight. We believe that examining the role of the audit committee 
chair, including the chair’s behaviors, characteristics, and personality 
traits, in ensuring audit committee effectiveness is worthy of future study.” 
 
This dissertation extends prior research on audit committees by examining the 
role of the audit committee chair in the financial reporting process.  I posit that audit 
committee chair turnover has a significant impact on the oversight of the financial 
statement process through the chair’s involvement with management and external 
auditors during financial statement audits.  The first part of the dissertation examines the 
impact of a change in audit committee chair on audit fees.  The assumption is that a 
change in audit committee chair could lead to significant changes in audit fees.  It is 
expected that a new audit committee chair may demand a more extensive audit, which 
would lead to higher audit fees.  Prior research suggests that audit fees are influenced by 
characteristics of the audit committee because of the significant association between audit 
committee characteristics and the financial reporting process. Audit committees are 
tasked with oversight of the financial reporting process, which includes the selection and 
retention or replacement of the external auditors reviewing the financial statements.  The 
audit committee is not only response for defining the scope of the audit but also to review 
and resolve disputes between management and the independent auditors.  For example, 
Abbott et al.(2004) found that independence and activity had a significant negative 
association with the occurrence of restatements.  Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) found 
that accounting expertise enhances many aspects of the financial reporting process.  A 
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natural extension is to examine the effect of an audit committee chair change on audit 
fees. 
The second part of the dissertation examines the impact of a change in audit 
committee chair on audit report lag.  I posit that a change in chair leads to a more 
extensive audit, which will manifest itself in more work for the auditors resulting in a 
greater time lag for audit reports.   
The third part of the dissertation follows naturally from the first two parts. If a 
change in the audit committee chair is associated with more extensive or better quality 
audits, then we should expect better quality financial reporting following the appointment 
of a new audit committee chair.  I use two different measures of financial reporting 
quality (or, lack thereof): subsequent restatements of financial statements and abnormal 
accruals. This also follows naturally from prior research indicates that audit committee 
characteristics are associated with accruals quality (Klein 1999; Bedard et al. 2004) and 
restatements (Abbott et al. 2004). 
I find that audit fees are higher in firms that have a change in the audit committee 
chair. The evidence related to the association between changes in the audit committee 
chair and audit report lag is mixed; I find evidence of such association in a changes 
model, but I do not find such association when using a levels model.  I find that there is 
no association between the change in audit committee chair and subsequent restatements, 
while abnormal accruals (absolute value of both performance matched total accruals and 
performance matched working capital accruals) are positively associated with the change 
in audit committee chair. Thus, there is no evidence that the change in audit committee 
chair is associated with higher quality financial reporting. 
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Overall, the results suggest that the change in audit committee chair has an 
important impact on the financial statement process of a company as it provides greater 
scrutiny of accounting decisions made by management.  These results are consistent with 
prior research that corporate governance has a significant impact on the financial 
statement process and expands the body of knowledge on the role of the audit committee 
chair in the financial reporting oversight process of public companies. 
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II. AUDIT CHAIR CHANGE AND AUDIT FEE 
 
Motivation 
 Even though the importance of audit committees for publicly traded companies 
was widely accepted by the end of the 1970’s, prior research has primarily focused on 
composition and diligence of the audit committee. There is no published research on the 
role of the audit committee chair in the financial reporting process.  The important role 
played by the audit committee chairs was noted by Cacello, Hermanson, and Ye (2011).   
 Prior research suggests that audit fees are influenced by audit committee 
characteristics because of the significant role played by the audit committee in the 
financial reporting process.  Given the significant role of the audit committee chair in 
setting the agenda of the committee and in the overall functioning of the audit committee, 
it is interesting to examine if audit fees are associated with changes in the audit 
committee chair.   
 The first part of the dissertation investigates the association between the audit 
committee chair change and audit fees.  This part of the dissertation will add to the body 
of research on the association between audit committees and audit fees by determining 
the significance of the role played by the audit committee chair.   
 
Background  
Audit committees play an important role in ensuring high quality financial 
reporting. This is because the primary responsibilities of the audit committee include 
providing oversight over the financial reporting process. As part of its duties, this 
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requires that the audit committee interact extensively with management, as well as both 
internal and external auditors. 
Recognizing the importance of audit committees, the SEC (1999a) noted: 
“Audit committees oversee and monitor management and the independent 
auditors in the financial reporting process, and thereby play a critical role in 
assuring the credibility of financial reporting. Audit committees can 
facilitate communications between a company's board of directors, its 
management, and its internal and independent auditors on significant 
accounting issues and policies. They can provide a forum separate from 
management in which auditors can candidly discuss any concerns. By 
effectively carrying out their many functions and responsibilities, audit 
committees help to enhance the reliability and credibility of financial 
reports.” 
 
The SEC also noted that it had, since at least the 1940s, encouraged the voluntary 
formation of effective audit committees. Specifically, the SEC (1999a) noted: 
“Since the early 1940s, the Commission, along with the auditing and 
corporate communities, has had a continuing interest in promoting 
effective and independent audit committees. It was, in large measure, with 
the Commission's encouragement, for instance, that the self-regulatory 
organizations first adopted audit committee requirements in the 1970s.  In 
1974 and 1978, the Commission adopted rules requiring certain 
disclosures about audit committees. In 1980, the Commission issued a 
staff report on corporate accountability that addresses some of the issues 
underlying today's proposals. Former SEC Commissioner James 
Treadway led the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
that issued recommendations on corporate audit committees in 1987.” 
 
Yet, even during the 1980s, many public companies did not have an audit 
committee made up of independent directors. Pincus et al. (1989) find that NASDAQ 
listed public companies that voluntarily formed audit committees were larger, had higher 
proportion of outside directors and lower managerial ownership, than companies that did 
not have such audit committees. The results of Pincus et al. (1989) suggest that higher the 
agency costs, the more incentive a company has to form an audit committee. 
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Early research supports the conjecture that the presence of an audit committee is 
associated with better financial reporting quality. McMullen (1996) formally tests the 
conjecture that the presence of an audit committee is associated with financial reporting 
quality. She measures (the lack of) high quality financial reporting by the incidence of 
errors, irregularities and illegal acts, shareholder litigation alleging fraudulent financial 
reporting, corrections of reported quarterly earnings, SEC enforcement action, and 
auditor turnover involving a disagreement with the client as proxies to measure financial 
reporting quality. McMullen (1996) finds that the presence of an audit committee is 
associated with reduced likelihood of shareholder lawsuits, restatements, enforcement 
actions and auditor turnover following disagreement between auditor and client. 
While the formation of an audit committee is the first step, having solely 
independent directors on the committee is the second step. The Treadway Commission, 
referred to in the SEC (1999a) cite above, recommended that the SEC require public 
companies to have audit committees consisting only of independent directors. However, 
the SEC did not mandate such a requirement and, while many SEC registrants had audit 
committees comprising of only independent directors, there were numerous public 
companies that either did not have audit committees or had audit committees that did not 
have solely independent directors.    
In 1998, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, in a speech entitled “The Numbers Game”, 
discussed the role of audit committees in ensuring high quality financial reporting. His 
speech led to the formation of two private sector task forces about the formation and 
functioning of effective audit committees. The Report of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC 1999) and the National 
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Association of Corporate Directors’ Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Audit Committees (NACD 2000) included recommendations to improve audit committee 
effectiveness.  
In addition to prodding the stock exchanges and public companies through 
speeches, the SEC also acted to strengthen the composition and functioning of audit 
committees. The SEC (1999b) adopted a rule “to improve disclosure relating to the 
functioning of corporate audit committees.” Specifically, the SEC’s (1999b) new rules 
require that: 
• companies include reports of their audit committees in their proxy 
statements; in the report, the audit committee must state whether the 
audit committee has: (i) reviewed and discussed the audited financial 
statements with management; (ii) discussed with the independent 
auditors the matters required to be discussed by Statement on 
Auditing Standards No. 61, as may be modified or supplemented; 
and (iii) received from the auditors disclosures regarding the 
auditors' independence required by Independence Standards Board 
Standard No. 1; … 
 
• the report of the audit committee also include a statement by the 
audit committee whether, based on the review and discussions noted 
above, the audit committee recommended to the Board of Directors 
that the audited financial statements be included in the company's 
Annual Report …; 
• companies disclose in their proxy statements whether their Board of 
Directors has adopted a written charter for the audit committee, and 
if so, include a copy of the charter as an appendix to the company's 
proxy statements at least once every three years; 
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has required, since 1978, listed 
companies to have only independent directors on audit committees. While the NYSE 
rules prohibited officers, employees and affiliates of the company from serving as audit 
committee members, there was still room for many “grey” directors to be on the audit 
committee. “Grey” directors include relatives of management, executives from customer 
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or supplier companies, bankers and business consultants, retired executives, as well as 
interlocking directors. Vicknair et al. (1993) find that 74 percent of the audit committees 
in their sample had at least one “grey” director; further, in 26 percent of their sample 
companies “grey” directors constituted a majority of the audit committee. The SEC 
(1999b) addressed this issue, by requiring that companies: 
“disclose in their proxy statements whether the audit committee members 
are “independent” as defined in the applicable listing standards, and 
disclose certain information regarding any director on the audit committee 
who is not “independent”.” 
The SEC continued to act to enhance the quality of audit committees. As part of 
the rule on auditor independence, the SEC (2000) modified the rule related to audit 
committees’ interactions with the external auditor. Specifically, the SEC (2000) noted 
that: 
“We have modified the proposed disclosure to require disclosure only of 
whether the audit committee considered whether the principal accountant's 
provision of the information technology services and other non-audit 
services to the registrant is compatible with maintaining the principal 
accountant's independence.  ... Investors will be aided by knowing whether 
the company's audit committee considered whether the provision of non-
audit services by the company's principal accountant is compatible with 
maintaining the accountant's independence.” 
 
The sudden bankruptcy of Enron, coupled with the demise of Andersen and the 
problems at WorldCom, led to the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002; 
multiple sections of SOX deal with the composition and functioning of audit committees.   
 Section 301 of SOX (2002) is titled “Public Company Audit Committees” and 
states as follows: 
``(m) Standards Relating to Audit Committees.-- 
``(1) Commission rules.-- 
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``(A) In general.—Effective not later than 270 days 
after the date of enactment of this subsection, 
the Commission shall, by rule, direct the 
national securities exchanges and national 
securities associations to prohibit the listing of 
any security of an issuer that is not in 
compliance with the requirements of any 
portion of paragraphs (2) through (6). … 
 
 
``(2) Responsibilities relating to registered public  accounting 
firms.--The audit committee of each issuer, in its capacity 
as a committee of the board of directors, shall be directly 
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and 
oversight of the work of any registered public accounting 
firm employed by that issuer (including resolution of 
disagreements between management and the auditor 
regarding financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing 
or issuing an audit report or related work, and each such 
registered public accounting firm shall report directly to 
the audit committee. 
 
 
      ``(3) Independence.-- 
 ``(A) In general.--Each member of the audit 
committee of the issuer shall be a member of 
the board of directors of the issuer, and shall 
otherwise be independent. 
 
``(B) Criteria.--In order to be considered to be 
independent for purposes of this paragraph, a 
member of an audit committee of an issuer 
may not, other than in his or her capacity as a 
member of the audit committee, the board of 
directors, or any other board committee— 
 
``(i)  accept any consulting, advisory,  
or other compensatory fee from 
the issuer; or 
``(ii) be an affiliated person of the 
issuer or any subsidiary thereof. 
 
``(C)  Exemption authority.--The Commission may exempt 
from the requirements of subparagraph (B) a 
particular relationship with respect to audit committee 
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members, as the Commission determines appropriate 
in light of the circumstances. 
 
As required by Section 301 of SOX, the SEC issued a rule proposal and then the final 
rules relating to audit committee director independence in 2003. The final SEC (2003) 
rules state as follows: 
(i)   Each member of the audit committee must be a member of the board 
of directors of the listed issuer, and must otherwise be independent; 
provided that, where a listed issuer is one of two dual holding 
companies, those companies may designate one audit committee for 
both companies so long as each member of the audit committee is a 
member of the board of directors of at least one of such dual holding 
companies. 
 
(ii) Independence requirements for non-investment company issuers. In 
order to be considered to be independent for purposes of this 
paragraph (b)(1), a member of an audit committee of a listed issuer 
that is not an investment company may not, other than in his or her 
capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors, 
or any other board committee: 
 
(A) Accept directly or indirectly any consulting, advisory, or 
other compensatory fee from the issuer or any subsidiary 
thereof, provided that, unless the rules of the national 
securities exchange or national securities association 
provide otherwise, compensatory fees do not include the 
receipt of fixed amounts of compensation under a retirement 
plan (including deferred compensation) for prior service 
with the listed issuer (provided that such compensation is 
not contingent in any way on continued service); or 
 
(B)  Be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof. 
 
Thus, while the SEC has urged public companies to have audit committees since 
at least 1940, the requirements for the composition of the committee have gradually 
changed in recent years. Further, the rules related to audit committee director 
independence have evolved in recent years culminating in the legal requirements of SOX. 
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However, even now, the SEC has left the actual definitions of director independence to 
the specific listing rules of the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock exchanges. 
Raghunandan and Rama (2007) note that there continues to be substantial variation 
among the listing requirements related to independence; there are instances when firms 
stated that their members were independent, yet disclosed transactions between the firm 
and the audit committee director(s) under the “Certain Relationships” section of the 
proxy statement. Nevertheless, following the SEC’s implementation of the SOX related 
requirements for audit committee director independence, researchers have rarely used 
director independence as a factor in research related to U.S. public companies.  
 
Audit Committee Director Expertise 
Regulators and legislators have started to push for qualifications beyond 
independence in recent years. Thus, for example, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1998) 
noted the need for audit committee directors to be financially literate; financial literacy  
was defined as “the ability to read and understand fundamental financial statements, 
including a company’s balance sheet, income statement and cash flow statement”.  
It is interesting to note that while SOX mandates audit committee director 
independence, it does not have a similar mandate for the financial expertise of audit 
committee directors. Section 407 of SOX is titled “Disclosure of Audit Committee 
Financial Expert” and reads as follows: 
(a) Rules Defining ``Financial Expert''.--The Commission shall issue 
rules, as necessary or appropriate in the public interest and 
consistent with the protection of investors, to require each issuer, 
together with periodic reports required pursuant to sections 13(a) 
and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to disclose 
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whether or not, and if not, the reasons therefor, the audit committee 
of that issuer is comprised of at least 1 member who is a financial 
expert, as such term is defined by the Commission. 
 
(b) Considerations.-- In defining the term ``financial expert'' for 
purposes of subsection (a), the Commission shall consider whether 
a person has, through education and experience as a public 
accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, comptroller, or 
principal accounting officer of an issuer, or from a position 
involving the performance of similar functions- 
 
(1) an understanding of generally accepted accounting  
      principles and financial statements; 
(2) experience in-- 
     (A) the preparation or auditing of financial  
statements of generally comparable           
issuers; and 
      (B) the application of such principles in  
   connection with the accounting for 
   estimates, accruals, and reserves; 
(3) experience with internal accounting controls; and 
(4) an understanding of audit committee functions. 
 
(c) Deadline for Rulemaking.--The Commission shall-- 
(1) propose rules to implement this section, not later than    
      90 days after the date of enactment of this Act; and 
(2) issue final rules to implement this section, not later  
      than 180 days after that date of enactment. 
 
In accordance with Section 407 of SOX, the SEC proposed rules related to the 
disclosure of audit committee financial experts. The initial proposal defined the term 
“financial expert” as follows: (SEC 2002a) 
“a person who has, through education and experience as a public 
accountant, auditor, principal financial officer, controller or principal 
accounting officer, of a company that, at the time the person held such 
position, was required to file reports pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of 
the Exchange Act, or experience in one or more positions that involve the 
performance of similar functions (or that results, in the judgment of the 
company's board of directors, in the person's having similar expertise and 
experience),the following attributes: 
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(1) An understanding of generally accepted accounting 
principles and financial statements; 
 
(2) Experience applying such generally accepted  
     accounting principles in connection with the accounting 
for estimates, accruals, and reserves that are generally 
comparable to the estimates, accruals and reserves, if 
any, used in the registrant's financial statements; 
 
(3) Experience preparing or auditing financial statements 
that present accounting issues that are generally 
comparable to those raised by the registrant's financial 
statements; 
 
(4) Experience with internal controls and procedures for 
financial reporting; and 
 
(5) An understanding of audit committee functions.”  
 
However, this proposal evoked significant opposition. Specifically, many 
commenters believed that the proposed definition of “audit committee financial expert” 
was unduly restrictive, and noted that many public companies would have a difficulty 
attracting qualified audit committee financial experts. News stories in the media noted 
that under the proposed definition, even eminent personalities such as the Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve (Alan Greenspan) or one of the richest investors in the world 
(Warren Buffett) would not qualify as “audit committee financial expert” since they did 
not have experience in “preparing” financial statements (Bryan-Low 2002).   
In light of such criticism, the SEC (2003a) revised the definition of an audit 
committee financial expert as follows: a person who understands GAAP; has an ability to 
assess the application of GAAP in association with estimates, accruals and reserves; has 
experience in the preparation, audit, analysis and evaluation of financial statements or has 
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experience in active supervision of such a person; has an understanding of internal 
controls and an understanding of the audit committee functions.   
Further, the SEC rules require that if a company discloses that it does not have an 
audit committee financial expert, it must also explain why it does not have such an 
expert.  William H. Donaldson, the Chairman of the SEC, noted in congressional 
testimony that “these disclosures will improve transparency to investor in evaluating the 
experience of the audit committees of companies in which they invest” (Donaldson 
2003).   
How difficult has it been for public companies to obtain qualified “audit 
committee financial experts?” Williams (2005) examines proxy disclosures by 489 firms 
(of which 370 were S&P 500 firms) and finds that more than 95 percent of all firms 
(including the smaller, non-S&P 500 firms) disclose the presence of at least one audit 
committee financial expert. Interestingly, 46 percent of the sample firms disclose the 
presence of two or more financial experts. Similarly, Carcello et al. (2006) find, using a 
sample of 400 companies, that 98 percent of the companies make the required financial 
expert disclosure; about 30 percent of companies had an increase in the number of 
experts since the passage of SOX. Krishnan and Lee (2009) examine why some firms 
choose to disclose more than one audit committee financial expert, as well as the choice 
between different types of experts. Their analysis of 802 firms (3,218 audit committee 
directors) indicates that about 60 percent of firms have has one or more accounting 
financial experts (as opposed to other types of “audit committee financial experts”) on the 
audit committee; further, firms in a high-litigation environment were more likely to have 
accounting financial experts on their audit committees.  
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 Does the market value the presence of accounting experts on the audit committee? 
The evidence in Davidson et al. (2004) and DeFond et al. (2005) suggests that there is a 
positive market reaction when companies hire audit committee directors with financial 
expertise. 
 
Prior Research 
Audit Committee Processes 
 Cohen et al. (2002) provide evidence about the functioning of audit committees 
on the basis of interviews with 36 auditors. The authors report that most respondents 
believe that “management is the primary driver of corporate governance” and that many 
auditors viewed audit committees as not sufficiently strong. However, this study was 
conducted prior to SOX; in a follow-up study, Cohen et al. (2007) interview 38 auditors 
after the enactment of SOX. Cohen et al. (2007) report that audit committees are more 
powerful, active and diligent post-SOX.  
 Gendron and Bedard (2006) examine the “black box” related to the functioning of 
audit committees. How do the directors develop and sustain audit committee 
effectiveness? These authors interviewed 22 individuals in three large Canadian public 
corporations, spending between 45 to 75 minutes with each individual. The authors 
suggest that the meaning of committee effectiveness is based on the reflection of 
processes and activities around audit committee meetings. 
 Beasley et al. (2009) examine the “substance versus symbolism” issue by 
conducting detailed interviews with 42 individuals serving on audit committees of U.S. 
public companies. The authors find that many of the respondents seek to provide 
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effective monitoring of financial reporting and avoid serving on ceremonial audit 
committees. Importantly, the authors report that many of the responses vary with the 
individual characteristics of the respondents as well as the time of appointment of the 
director (pre- or post-SOX). 
 
Audit Committee Interaction with External Auditors 
As previously noted, the primary role of the audit committee is to provide 
oversight over the financial reporting process. Hence, the audit committee must have 
unfettered and effective interactions with external auditors. I now turn to studies that 
examine the interaction between audit committees and external auditors. 
Financial statements are, ultimately, the product of negotiations between 
management and the external auditor. An effective audit committee must, therefore, 
provide strong support to external auditors if the aim is to have high quality financial 
reporting. Such support is particularly important in situations involving professional 
judgments; this is because it is precisely in those areas that disagreements between 
management and auditors are bound to occur. 
Does audit committee composition affect the extent of support received by external 
auditors in difficult situations? Carcello and Neal (2000, 2003) examine one such 
situation: when the auditor is considering the issuance of a going-concern modified audit 
opinion. Carcello and Neal (2000) find that there is a significant negative association 
between the percentage of affiliated directors on the audit committee and the likelihood 
of a going-concern modified audit opinion for financially stressed firms. This suggests 
that audit committee composition can influence the support received by external auditors.   
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 In a follow-up study, Carcello and Neal (2003) examine the association between 
audit committee independence and auditor dismissal following the issuance of a new 
going-concern modified audit report. Since managements usually do not like receiving a 
going-concern modified audit opinion, they may retaliate against the auditor by 
dismissing an auditor who issues a going-concern modified audit opinion, particularly if 
the company subsequently does not fail—that is, if ex-post, the opinion can be viewed as 
“erroneous.” Using a sample of companies receiving an initial going-concern modified 
audit opinion, Carcello and Neal (2003) find that in companies with audit committees that 
have fewer affiliated directors an auditor dismissal is less likely following the issuance of 
a new going-concern modified audit opinion. 
DeZoort et al. (2003) examine audit committee support to the external auditor 
using responses obtained from 55 audit committee directors. In the experimental task, 
respondents evaluated judgments about materiality and accounting precision in situations 
involving auditor-management differences.  The results indicate that audit committees 
that include members with financial expertise experience are more likely to support 
external auditors in such disputes with management. In a later experiment, DeZoort et al. 
(2008) compare audit committee director responses before and after SOX; these authors 
find that audit committee members are likely to support the external auditor, when there 
is auditor-client differences related to proposed adjustments, in the post-SOX period 
when compared to the results from the pre-SOX study.  
Cohen and colleagues conducted two surveys of auditors and audit committee 
directors to elicit information about the underlying audit committee processes. In Cohen 
et al. (2010) the interview subjects are auditors; the authors note that “auditors report that 
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the corporate governance environment has improved considerably in the post-SOX era 
with audit committees that are substantially more active, diligent, knowledgeable, and 
powerful.” In a later study, Cohen et al. (2013) report findings from interviews of audit 
committee directors. The authors note that there is a marked difference in the monitoring 
role of the audit committee in the post-SOX period. Specifically, the subjects reported 
increased interaction between the audit committee and the external auditor, as well as 
heightened attention to matters of audit and financial reporting addressed in such 
interactions. 
 Another stream of research examines the association between audit committee 
characteristics and auditor changes. Archambeault and DeZoort (2001) examine the 
association between “suspicious” auditor changes and audit committee characteristics.  
Using a sample of 30 U.S. public companies that had suspicious audit switches and a 
matched sample of 30 companies without such auditor switch during the period 1994-
1996, the authors find that companies with a suspicious auditor switch are less likely to 
have audit committee directors with accounting or finance expertise. Owens-Jackson et 
al. (2009) examine the association between audit committee characteristics and auditor 
changes subsequent to events such as: disagreement with management, resignation of the 
auditor, disagreement over audit fees, and non-standard audit opinions. Their sample 
includes 60 firms with such auditor changes during the years 1993-2001. The results from 
Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) suggest that such auditor changes are less likely in the 
presence of an audit committee that is more independent and has more financial 
expertise.  
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Audit Fees 
There is an extensive literature on the determinants of audit fees.  The seminal 
paper in this area is by Simunic (1980), whose research was motivated by questions about 
the extent of competition in the market for audit services. In light of congressional 
hearings about the dominance of the (then) Big Eight accounting firms, Simunic (1980) 
examined clients’ audit fees. For this exercise, he came up with a model of audit fees that 
includes variables proxying for client size, business complexity, audit risk, and auditor 
type. Variants of the model used by Simunic (1980) have been used by almost all 
subsequent research that has audit fees as the focus of analysis. In particular, the log-log 
model (where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of audit fees, and client size 
is measured by the natural logarithm of client assets) owes its origin to Simunic (1980). 
Simunic’s model was subsequently refined by many other researchers, and used 
for examining other policy-issues related to the market for audit services. For example, 
Francis and Simon (1987) examine audit pricing for small clients. Using data from 210 
publicly traded companies, the authors find that there is an audit fee premium for the Big 
eight firms. In addition, data from a sub-sample of initial audit engagements show that 
there is significant discounting of audit fees for initial audit engagements when compared 
to continuing engagements. This notion of low-balling of audit fees is examined further 
in Simon and Francis (1988). Using data from 214 clients changing auditors, and 226 
clients without an auditor change, the authors find that there is a significant initial year 
audit fee discount; the average discount is 24 percent fee in the initial engagement year 
and 15 percent for the two subsequent years. The fee reverts back to “normal” levels by 
the fourth year of the engagement.   
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A natural extension of the “Big N premium” is to see if such premiums are found 
in other countries, and also if there are differences within the Big Eight firms. One area 
that has received significant attention is industry specialization by audit firms. Craswell 
et al. (1995) use Australian data and find that, apart from a Big Eight fee audit fee 
premium, there is also a significant premium for industry specialist Big 8 auditors 
compared to non-specialist Big 8 auditors. Defond et al.(2000) examine the audit fees of 
publicly listed companies in Hong Kong using 348 publicly listed companies from 1992. 
These authors find that there is both a Big 6 audit firm premium and an industry specialist 
auditor premium. Another strand of research examines if the differences between firms 
can be extended to differences between offices within firms. That is, is industry 
specialization at the national level or is it more appropriately classified at the city (or 
MSA) level? Ferguson et al. (2003) find, using data from clients of Big 5 firms in 
Australia, that  if an auditor is both city specific industry leader and a national level 
industry specialist, there is a significant audit fee premium; in contrast, there is no fee 
premium for auditors who are not city-level specialists.  
 Hay et al. (2006) conduct a meta-analysis of prior research related to the 
determinants of audit fees. The analysis suggests that while the specific variables may 
vary across studies and countries, in general variables proxying for the following broad 
characteristics are associated with audit fees: client size, business complexity, financial 
condition, audit risk, auditor type, as well as variables related to the executives and audit 
committee of the client.  
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Audit Fees and Client Risk Measures 
Many studies show that audit fees are related to various proxies for client risk. 
Bell et al. (2001) use confidential work-papers related to the audits of 422 clients 
conducted by a large accounting firm in 1989.  The authors show that audit fees are 
positively related to the auditor-assessed level of client business risk.  They note that the 
increase in audit fees arises solely out of additional hours worked, as there was no change 
in the hourly billing rate. Bedard and Johnstone (2004) find similar results using data 
provided by a large audit firm.  The data used in their analyses are derived from 
engagement partners’ assessments of clients made during the participating firm’s 2000-
2001 client continuance risk assessment process. The authors find a positive association 
between earnings manipulation risk and both audit hours and hourly billing rates.  
Abbott et al. (2006) use data from 429 non-financial clients of the Big 5 firms 
during 2000, and find a significant positive association between the level of audit fees 
and the direction of discretionary accruals.  Income-increasing (income-decreasing) 
discretionary accruals are positively associated with higher (lower) audit fees, suggesting 
that auditors consider client risk when pricing engagements. Charles et al. (2010) report 
similar results using a proprietary measure of financial reporting risk as the variable of 
interest; this risk measure is positively related to audit fees, in a sample consisting of 
4,320 firm-years from Big 5 clients during the 2000-2003 period.  
Venkataraman et al. (2008), using data from 142 firms that go public between 
January 1, 2000 and December 21, 2002, find that audit fees are higher for IPO 
engagements as compared to post-IPO engagements; this again suggests that audit fees 
are higher when the auditor anticipates a higher risk associated with the client. Feldmann 
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et al. (2009) examine audit fees for 228 clients restating prior financial statements during 
2004-2005. These authors find that audit fees are higher for their sample of restating 
firms when compared to a control sample of non-restating firms.  The authors suggest 
one explanation for the fee premium is the auditor’s perception of an increase in risk 
associated with the audit.  Munsif et al. (2011) analyze the audit fees of 1,610 SEC 
registrants that remediated previously disclosed internal control weaknesses during the 
years 2004 to 2007.  The authors document that while audit fees are lower for firms that 
remediate such weaknesses opposed to firms that do not remediate, the fee premium 
associated with the adverse internal control report persists for three years after the 
remediation. These findings suggest that auditors indeed factor client risk into the pricing 
of the audit.  
In summary, prior research provides evidence that audit fees are associated with 
the auditor’s assessed level of client risk. Further, audit committees constitute an 
important element of a company’s overall control environment. Hence, the characteristics 
of the audit committee directors can be expected to be a significant factor in the external 
auditor’s assessment of client risk and, thus, audit fees.  
 
Association between Audit Committee Composition and Audit Fees  
Given the requirement in SOX that the audit committee be responsible for the 
selection and compensation of the audit committee, it is likely that characteristics of the 
audit committee will be associated with audit fees. This relationship was likely even 
before SOX, given that the audit committee is an important component of the governance 
mechanism of a company and, hence, constituted an important element in the overall 
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client risk assessment by the external auditor. Accordingly, some prior studies have 
examined the association between audit committee characteristics and the external audit 
fees. 
Carcello et al. (2002) examine the association between governance mechanisms 
and audit fees. The data in their study are based on a questionnaire sent to controllers of 
Fortune 1000 companies, and rely on audit fees paid during the period from April 1992 to 
March 1993. The results show that audit committee characteristics, such as audit 
committee independence and expertise, have a positive relationship with audit fees. 
While the data in Carcello et al. (2002) are based on surveys, Abbott et al. (2003a) use 
data publicly disclosed by companies (subsequent to the SEC’s November 2000 rule 
mandating such disclosure in proxy statements filed with the Commission on or after 
February 5, 2001). These authors find that audit committees that have only independent 
members and has members with financial expertise are more likely to demand increased 
scope of auditing services from their external auditors, which in turn results in higher 
audit fees.  In a related study, Abbott et al. (2003b) examine the association between 
audit committee characteristics and the relative magnitude of nonaudit services (NAS) 
fees paid to incumbent auditors. The results indicate that the nonaudit fee ratio is lower in 
companies that have audit committees with only independent directors and higher 
meeting frequency. 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) examine whether the presence of an audit 
committee, as well as specific audit committee characteristics, are associated with higher 
audit fees. The data are from 401 firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange in 
October 2000. These authors find that audit committee expertise is associated with higher 
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audit fees.  Hoitash and Hoitash (2008), using data from 2,393 firms during 2004, find 
that a strong audit committee usually demands a higher level of assurance and less is 
likely to dismiss its auditors.  
 
Research Question 
 Prior research suggests that audit fees are influenced by audit committee 
characteristics because of the significant role played by the audit committee in the 
financial reporting process.  However, such prior studies have primarily focused on audit 
committee director independence and financial expertise, and diligence of the audit 
committee.   
 As noted by Carcello et al. (2011), the audit committee chair plays an important 
role in the monitoring of corporate financial reporting. Hence, it is likely that a change in 
the audit committee chair will be associated with changes in audit fees. One argument is 
that the appointment of a new audit committee chair could increase the auditor’s 
assessment of inherent risk; this, in turn, could lead to more effort (to reduce the 
detection risk) and hence lead to higher audit fees. Alternatively, a new audit committee 
chair could demand a higher level of assurance, which also would lead to higher audit 
fees. Conversely, if the new audit committee chair believes that the audit fees are 
“excessive” then there could be a demand to reduce audit fees. Ultimately, it is an 
empirical question if the appointment of a new audit committee chair leads to higher or 
lower audit fees. Hence, I frame the research question in the null form as follows: 
RQ1:  Is there an association between audit fees and the change in the audit chair?    
 
 28
Method 
 The following regression model was used to test the first research question: 
Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*InvRecTA + β3*Foreign + β4*SqrtSeg     
+ β5*CurrentRatio + β6*Loss + β7*Leverage + β8*Big4                          
+ β9*GCOpinion  + β10*Initial + β11*ICW + β12*ACCC + ε (1)  
 
Ln(AuditFees) = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*InvRecTA + β3*Foreign + β4*SqrtSeg     
+ β5*CurrentRatio + β6*Loss + β7*Leverage + β8*Big4                          
+ β9*GCOpinion  + β10*Initial + β11*ICW + β12*BD + β13*NM + ε (2) 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 Ln(AuditFees) = Natural logarithm of audit fees; 
Ln(TotalAssets) = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
 InvRecTA = Inventory plus accounts receivable as a proportion of total assets; 
 Foreign = I if company has foreign operations, 0 otherwise; 
 SqrtSeg = Square root of the number of segments; 
 CurrentRatio =  Ratio of current assets to current liabilities; 
 Loss = 1 if company has a loss before extraordinary items, 0 otherwise; 
 Leverage =  Ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
 Big4 = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 audit firm, 0 otherwise; 
 GCOpinion = 1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion, 0 otherwise; 
 Initial =  1 if the audit engagement is the first year audit, 0 otherwise; 
 ICW = 1 if the firm has a material internal control weakness (disclosed  
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   pursuant to SOX 404), 0 otherwise; 
 ACCC = 1 if there was a change in the Audit Committee Chair, 0 otherwise; 
 BD = 1 if new Audit Committee Chair was previously a member of the 
audit committee, 0 otherwise; 
 NM = 1 if new Audit Committee Chair was previously a member of the 
board (but not on audit committee), 0 otherwise; 
 The natural log of audit fees (Ln[AuditFees]) is used as the dependent variable, 
which is consistent with prior research in the auditing literature.  Typically, the 
estimation model that has been used in prior research regresses audit fees against a 
number of measures that are hypothesized to relate to audit fees. 
 The natural log of total assets (Ln[TotalAssets]) is used as a proxy for firm size.  
Prior Research going all the way back to Simunic (1980) has found a strong correlation 
between total assets and audit fee because larger firms require greater time and effort in 
their audits due to the size and scope of their business operations.  It is therefore expected 
that the coefficient of Ln(TotalAssets) will be positive. 
 Inventory and accounts receivables as a proportion of total assets (InvRecTA), 
foreign operations (Foreign) and the square root of segments (SqrtSeg) are included in 
the model because they are all considered to be measures of complexity that have an 
impact on audit fees.  All three of these control variables are expected to have a positive 
coefficient. 
    Five of the other variables used in the models control for client risk and include 
the following; Current Ratio (CurrentRatio), Net Loss before extraordinary items (Loss), 
Financial Leverage (Leverage), Going Concern Opinion (GCOpinion), and Internal 
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Control Weakness (ICW).  All of these variables are expected to have positive 
coefficients. 
 Big4 is included in the models because prior research has found that the largest 
international public accounting firms charge a premium for their audit services.  It is 
therefore expected that Big4 will have a positive coefficient.  Additionally, prior research 
has found that audit fees are discounted in the initial years of an audit engagement (e.g. 
Simon and Frances 1988; Whisenant et al. 2003).  Initial is included in the model and is 
expected to have a negative coefficient.  
 The remaining variables in the models relate to the change in the audit committee 
chair as well as indicate the role of the individual prior to becoming the chair.  The 
change in the audit committee chair variable (ACCC) indicates if a change has taken and 
board member (BD) as well as not a member of the board (NM) indicate prior roles if a 
change took place. 
 
Sample  
 I begin the sample selection process using all 3,417 companies from the 2009 
Corporate Library Company Data file. I eliminate foreign companies (173), companies 
with fiscal year-end not around 12/31 (809), and companies in the financial, insurance, or 
real estate sector (603).  This resulted in a sample of 1,832 companies for which 
Corporate Library director information was available. I then compare the 2009 
Corporate Library Directors Data file to the 2008 file for the 1,832 companies.   
 I use the information from the 2009 and 2008 Corporate Library Directors Data 
files to determine which audit committee chairs in 2009 were not audit committee chairs 
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in 2008. This comparison indicates that there are 339 firms, which had a new audit 
committee chair in 2009. The audit committee chairs in 2009 that were not chairs in 2008 
were also identified as to their role on the board in 2008 (that is, whether the new chair 
was already an audit committee member, board member but not an audit committee 
member, or not a member of the board). 
 For the 1,832 companies, I obtain financial data from Compustat database, and 
audit related data (name of the audit firm, audit fees, audit opinion, and internal control 
opinion) from Audit Analytics database.  There were 70 companies with missing financial 
data resulting in a sample size of 1,762 companies for the audit fee model.  Table 1 
provides details of the sample selection. 
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression 
model.  The mean audit fee for the sample companies is $2.597 million while the median 
is $1.300 million.  The mean and median of total assets are $512 million and $77 million, 
respectively.  Both of these distributions appear to be highly skewed, so consistent with 
prior research, the natural logarithm is used to transform both audit fees and total assets.  
The mean and median of the ratio of inventory and accounts receivable to total assets is 
0.21 and 0.17, respectively.  On average, the companies in the sample data have about 2 
segments, consistent with the data from prior studies.  The mean and median of the 
current ratio for the sample data is 2.56 and 1.81 respectively.  Slightly more than half of 
the companies had foreign operations.  .  About 5 percent of the companies had a going 
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concern modified audit opinion, while about 3 percent of the companies had an internal 
control weakness.  Given that the sample includes a significant amount of large 
companies, it was not unexpected that over 84 percent were audited by a Big 4 
accounting firm.  Less than 5 percent of the companies in sample had an audit 
engagement that was the first year of the audit.  About 19 percent of the companies had a 
change in the audit committee chair, with about 11 percent of those individuals not being 
on the board the prior year.  
 
Regression Results 
 The regression results using Ln(AuditFees) as the dependent variable and ACCC 
as the variable of interest are presented in the first three columns of Table 3 (Model 1).  
The overall regression model is significant (p < 0.001) with an adjusted R2 of 75 percent.  
The same can be said for the regression results using Ln(AuditFees) as a dependent 
variable and BD, and NM as the variables of interest, the results of which are presented in 
the last three columns of Table 3 (Model 2). 
 All the control variables in the two models (except for CurrentRatio and Initial) 
are significant and have the expected coefficient signs.  The variables of interest (ACCC, 
and BD), which are the variables associated with the change in the audit committee chair, 
all have positive coefficients and all are significant (p < .05).  NM is a variable of interest 
that missed being significant by a small amount (p = .062).  These results indicate that 
audit fees are higher when an audit committee has a new chair regardless of the new 
chairs prior involvement with the company’s board. In terms of effect size, a new Audit 
Committee Chair is associated with an increase of about 11 percent in audit fees.  Since a 
 33
new audit committee chair will typically review with greater detail, require clarifications, 
or question previous decisions related to the audit, the audit fee will be higher. 
 
Summary 
 Regulators and legislators have recognized that audit committees constitute an 
important element in the corporate financial reporting process. The interaction between 
the audit committee and external auditors is important in ensuring high quality financial 
reporting. While prior studies have examined the association between some audit 
committee characteristics and audit fees, the role of the audit committee chair has not 
been investigated in such studies. More generally, there is little archival research related 
to the role played by the audit committee chair in the oversight of financial reporting 
process. 
 The first part of the dissertation investigates the association between the audit 
committee chair change and audit fees.  This part of the dissertation adds to the body of 
research on audit committees and audit fees and documents the significance of the role 
played by the audit committee chair in the external financial reporting process.      
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III. AUDIT CHAIR CHANGE AND AUDIT REPORT LAGS 
 
Motivation 
 Audit report lag is measured by comparing the company’s fiscal year-end date to 
the date of the external audit report.  Since many of the audit procedures are performed 
after the fiscal year end, audit report lag is considered a proxy for audit effort; in addition, 
prior research has documented such association between incremental audit effort and the 
audit report lag. A number of factors have been found to effect audit report lag including 
client size and other characteristics (such as financial condition, industry membership, 
etc.), auditor characteristics, and auditor change.  
 The second part of the dissertation investigates the association between the audit 
committee chair change and audit report lags.  This part of the dissertation will add to the 
body of research on the association between audit committees and audit report lags by 
determining the significance of the role played by the audit committee chair.      
 
Background 
 Regulators and legislators have long been concerned about the need for the timely 
disclosure of information. This is because late disclosure of financial information can 
lead to higher degree of information asymmetry (Hakansson 1977). This explains the 
significant negative market reaction associated with late disclosure of financial 
information (Chambers and Penman 1984; Easton and Zmijewski 1993). Thus, for 
example, the SEC has rules about the time within which registrants must file their 
periodic financial statements with the commission. Starting in 1946 (1970), the deadline 
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was 90 (45) days to file the Form 10-K (10-Q) with the Commission. The SEC also 
requires that registrants that are unable to file annual or quarterly statements by the 
applicable deadlines file a notice of non-timely filings (Form NT filings) with the 
Commission.  
 Such focus on timely reporting has also been reflected in legislative actions. For 
example, Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) authorized the SEC to 
require registrants to disclose, “... on a rapid and current basis such additional 
information concerning material changes in the financial condition or operations of the 
issuer.”  
 Consistent with SOX, the SEC initially proposed to reduce the filing deadlines; 
however, there was strong opposition to such reduction in filing deadlines from both 
company managements and their auditors. In the face of opposition, the SEC modified 
the rules by creating different classes of filers with differing deadlines (SEC 2002, 2005). 
The SEC now requires large-accelerated filers (i.e., public companies with public float of 
$700 million or more) and accelerated filers (i.e., public companies with public float 
between $75 million and $700 million) to file their annual reports within 60 and 75 days, 
respectively, of the fiscal year end for fiscal year ends on or after December 15, 2006; 
non-accelerated filers continue to have a 90 day deadline to file their annual reports with 
the SEC (SEC 2005). Both accelerated and large accelerated filers had filing deadlines of 
75 days for fiscal year ends between December 15, 2003 and December 14, 2006; this 
was further reduced to 60 days, for large accelerated filers, for fiscal year ends on or after 
December 15, 2006.  
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 In addition, the SEC’s Rule 12b-25 requires that registrants that fail to timely file 
their quarterly or annual reports (i.e., 10-Q or 10-K) with the Commission notify the 
Commission with an appropriate Form NT (i.e., “Non-Timely”) no later than one day 
after the due date of the filing. Such Form NT filings lead to an automatic one-time 
extension of 5 days for 10-Qs and 15 days for 10-Ks. Registrants that later file their 10-Q 
or 10-K before the extended deadline are deemed to have filed on a timely basis, but 
those that do not file within the extended deadline are subject to penalties including 
deregistration by the SEC and delisting by stock exchanges, which in turn leads to 
inability to raise capital through public securities. Thus, registrants have incentives to file 
annual reports with the SEC on a timely basis; this in turn means that auditors have 
incentives to complete their audits on a timely basis, i.e., to ensure that audit report lag is 
not excessive. 
 
Prior Research 
Determinants of Audit Report Lag 
 Given the importance of audit report lag, many prior studies have examined the 
determinants of audit report lag (Ashton et al. 1987, Ashton et al.1989, Newton and 
Ashton 1989, Kinney and McDaniel 1993, Bamber et al. 1993, and Schwartz and Soo 
1996, Henderson and Kaplan 2000, Knechel and Payne 2001).  The above studies 
examine data from the pre-SOX period; studies that have examined audit report lag in the 
post-SOX period include Ettredge et al. (2006), Krishnan and Yang 2009), and Tanyi et 
al. (2010). 
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 Ashton et al. (1987) is the first study that seeks to explain the determinants of 
audit report lag in terms of client and auditor characteristics. These authors collected data 
from surveys mailed to managing partners of U.S. offices of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & 
Co. The data are for audit engagements in 1982. Ashton et al. (1987) find that, as 
expected, good internal controls and the performance of interim audit work are associated 
with shorter audit report lag. However, public traded companies, busy season (i.e., 
December 31) fiscal year-end, and qualified audit opinions are associated with longer 
audit report lag. In a subsequent study, Ashton et al. (1989) examine audit report lag 
using data from 465 Canadian public companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. 
Their results show that auditor type (Big 8 or not), bottom line loss, extraordinary items 
on the income statement, and the presence of contingencies are related to the audit report 
lag. 
 During the late 1980s, many auditing researchers were interested with the extent 
of judgment versus structure in the audit approaches of large international audit firms. 
Some prior studies have examined the association between the use of structure versus 
judgment in audit approaches and various audit-related processes and outcomes. Thus, 
for example, Williams and Dirsmith (1988) examine the association between audit 
technology and audit report lag; the hypothesis in their study is that such differences in 
audit approaches can lead to differences in audit efficiency and thus can be a significant 
factor in explaining when the auditors complete an audit engagement (i.e., affect the audit 
report lag). Williams and Dirsmith (1988) use data from 679 companies with financial 
statement and earnings announcement data from the Compustat and IBES databases, 
respectively. Consistent with other studies, the construct of audit technology is measured 
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as the relative degree of structure versus judgment of a CPA firm’s audit technology. The 
results indicate that firms employing a structured audit approach have, ceteris paribus, 
shorter audit report lags and that clients of such auditors have shorter earnings 
announcement lags.  
Bamber et al. (1993) re-visit the association between audit approaches and audit 
report lag. They find, using a sample of public companies during the period from 1983 to 
1985, that audit firms employing a structured audit approach have shorter audit report 
lag. 
 It is likely that special situations, such as those related to an auditor change, 
would have a significant effect on the audit report lag. In particular, auditor changes that 
occur late during a fiscal year can be expected to have a longer audit report lag; this is 
because there is less time for the auditor to get to know the client and understand the 
business and processes of the client. Schwartz and Soo (1996) examine the association 
between the timing of auditor change (that is, how long before the fiscal year end did the 
auditor change happen) and the audit report lag with the incoming auditor. Their sample 
includes 502 firms with auditor changes between 1988 and 1993. Schwartz and Soo 
(1996) find that firms that switch auditors earlier (later) in the fiscal year tend to have 
shorter (longer) audit report lag. 
 Knechel and Payne (2001) examine some other factors that could arguably affect 
the audit report lag. These factors are: audit effort measured by the number of actual 
hours invested in the engagement, the allocation of the audit team members by rank, and 
the provision of non-audit services. These authors obtain proprietary data related to 226 
clients from a large audit firm.  Knechel and Payne (2001) show that there is a significant 
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positive association between audit effort, the use of inexperienced audit staff and audit 
report lag. However, the provision of non-audit services is negatively associated with 
audit report lag, presumably because of the benefits from synergy. 
 All of the above referenced studies examine audit report lags in the pre-SOX 
period. SOX fundamentally changed the environment of auditing. In addition, Section 
404 of SOX led to significant changes in the audit approaches of firms. Given the 
emphasis in SOX about internal controls, Ettredge et al.(2006) examine the association 
between internal control quality and audit report lags in the post-SOX period. Their 
analyses use 2,344 firms with SOX 404 data on internal controls for the first year of such 
internal control reporting (2004). These authors find that, as expected, there is a 
significant increase in audit report lag after SOX. Consistent with expectations, the 
authors also find that firms with material weakness in internal control have significantly 
longer audit report lag.  Krishnan and Yang (2009) examine the trend in audit report lags 
before and after the enactment of SOX. The authors report that audit report lag “increased 
significantly in the two-year period 2001–2002 prior to the introduction of the accelerated 
filing requirements and in the period 2003–2006 when the new filing requirements were 
in effect.”    
Tanyi et al. (2010) examine audit report lags for different types of auditor 
changes. Specifically, given the sudden demise of Arthur Andersen, they examine audit 
report lags for ex-Andersen clients and other client that changed auditors. The results 
indicate that the audit report lag is significantly higher for ex- Andersen clients (that did 
not follow their Andersen partner to the new audit firm) than for clients voluntarily 
changing auditors from another Big 5 predecessor for the fiscal year ended December 31, 
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2002; interestingly, the differences in audit reporting lags between the two groups are not 
significant for the fiscal years 2000 (the last year before Andersen’s Enron related 
problems surfaced), or 2003 (the second year with the successor auditor). Further, ex-
Andersen clients that followed the Andersen partner to the new audit firm had shorter 
audit report lags than ex-Andersen clients that did not follow their Andersen partner. 
Finally, clients with voluntary (i.e., non-Andersen) auditor changes have only marginally 
higher audit reporting lags compared to clients without auditor changes. 
 Some prior studies have examined the determinants and consequences associated 
with non-timely filings. Alford et al. (1993) provide descriptive evidence about the 
frequency of late 10-K filings during the years 1978 to 1985, and the financial 
characteristics of such firms. The evidence indicates that non-timely filers tend to be 
financially distressed.  
 Two recent studies examine the capital market costs of Form NT-10K filings 
(indicating non-timely filing of annual Form 10-K with the SEC). Bartov et al. (2008) 
find that there is a significant negative market reaction to the filing of a Form NT-10K, 
while Gao et al. (2011) show that there is a new trend of activist bondholders actively 
enforcing covenants related to technical defaults for firms that fail to file financial 
statements on time; such enforcement in turn leads to significant drops in stock and bond 
prices.  
 Wang et al. (2013) examine 11,024 firm-year observations during the years 2007 
to 2010 and find that for accelerated filer firms, audit fees are, ceteris paribus, 26 (12) 
percent higher for those firms that had a Form NT-10K filing in the previous (current) 
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year, after controlling for other measures of risk traditionally used in audit fee models, 
including the presence of material weaknesses in internal control.   
 
Audit Committees and Internal Control 
 I now discuss prior research related to the association between audit committee 
characteristics and internal control, and the association between audit committees and 
audit risk. I first summarize research related to the association between audit committees 
and internal control reporting, and then discuss the association between audit committees 
and internal auditing. I then develop the arguments about the expected association 
between change in audit committee chair and the audit report lag. 
 DeZoort (1997) uses responses from 87 subjects to examine if experience has an 
effect on audit committee members’ judgments. The experimental task required 
respondents to complete an internal control oversight judgments. The results indicate that 
audit committee members who have domain and task specific knowledge (that is, those 
that have prior experience in auditing and internal controls) made judgments similar to 
those made by external auditors in the evaluation of internal controls, in contrast to audit 
committee directors without such prior experience.  
 Krishnan (2005) examines the association between audit committee composition 
and internal control reporting. She first identified 128 companies that changed auditors 
between 1994 and 2000, and disclosed internal control problems in Form 8-Ks related to 
the auditor change; the matched control sample includes companies that changed auditors 
but did not have such internal control issues. She finds that such internal control problem 
disclosures are less likely if the audit committee of the client has a higher proportion of 
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independent members; similarly, problem disclosures are less likely in the presence of 
financial experts on the audit committee.  
 The evidence in Krishnan (2005) is from the pre-SOX period; in addition, her 
sample only includes clients changing auditors. Recognizing the need for a broader 
sample, Krishnan and Viswanathan (2007) examine if the presence of financial experts 
on the audit committee is associated with (lack of) internal control weaknesses. These 
authors study 90 companies that reported internal control weaknesses between November 
15, 2004 and March 1, 2005 and a control sample of companies in the same industry that 
did not report such internal control weaknesses. The results indicate that companies with 
internal control weaknesses were less likely to have financial experts on the audit 
committee. In a contemporaneous study, Zhang et al. (2007) identify 208 firms with 
material internal control problems disclosed pursuant to SOX 302 or 404 from November 
15, 2004 to July 2005. The authors use a matched-sample of 208 firms without internal 
control weaknesses. The analyses indicate that firms with internal control problems are 
less likely to have experts (both accounting and non-accounting financial experts) on the 
audit committee.   
 Having an internal control problem is one issue. A somewhat related issue is the 
remediation of such problems, after the problems have been discovered. Goh (2009) 
examines if audit committee characteristics are associated with the timeliness of 
remediation of material weaknesses in internal control. He finds that firms with larger 
audit committees and greater proportion of non-accounting financial expertise take steps 
to remediate problems related to internal controls in a timelier manner.  
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 Naiker and Sharma (2009) examine the association between the presence of 
different types of former audit partners (affiliated or not) on the audit committee and the 
disclosure of internal control problems. These authors suggest that audit committee 
members who have been audit partners on the engagement in their previous roles (when 
with the audit firm) would be more effective monitors of internal control weaknesses 
compared to their counterparts without such experience. Using a sample of 1,225 firms 
that make SOX 404 disclosures for the 2004 fiscal year, the authors find the presence of 
such affiliated audit partners is associated with lower number of reported internal control 
deficiencies.   
 In summary, prior research shows that audit committee characteristics are 
important in the internal control reporting framework. Audit committee members can 
play a crucial role in effective monitoring of internal controls and financial reporting by 
maintaining constant communication with management, external auditors and internal 
auditors. 
 
Audit Committees and Interaction with Internal Auditing 
The Blue Ribbon Committee, referred to earlier, and others have noted that 
internal auditing is one important leg in the multi-legged table of corporate governance. 
Hence, to be effective, there must be regular, unfettered communication between the 
audit committee and internal auditing. Such communication can, in turn, lead to better 
monitoring by the audit committee. Internal auditing can be a natural friend of the audit 
committee—since both internal auditing and audit committee have important roles in the 
monitoring of internal controls and deterrence of fraud and errors.  
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Scarbrough et al. (1998) conduct a survey of Canadian chief internal auditors to 
examine the interactions between audit committees and chief internal auditors. These 
authors examine the following issues related to the interaction of the audit committee 
with internal auditing: (1) the involvement of the audit committee in the hiring and firing 
of the chief internal auditor, (2) frequency and type of meetings between the audit 
committee and the chief internal auditor, and (3) audit committee review of the internal 
auditing program and results. The results show that the composition the audit committee 
has a significant influence on the interactions between the audit committee and the chief 
internal auditor.  In a replication and extension of the Scarborough et al. (1998) study, 
Raghunandan et al. (2001) surveyed chief internal auditors of U.S. public companies. 
Raghunandan et al. (2001) find that audit committees that did not have inside or gray 
directors and had at least one member with accounting or finance expertise are more 
likely to (a) have longer meetings with the chief internal auditor, (b) provide access to the 
chief internal auditor and (c) review the internal audit program and review management’s 
interaction with internal audit. Taken together, these two studies indicate that the 
composition of the audit committee has a significant influence on the committees’ 
interaction with the chief internal auditor and, hence, on the quality of monitoring. 
Barua et al. (2010) study the association between various audit committee 
characteristics and the internal audit budget using data from 181 firms. The results 
indicate that audit committees that had long-tenured members and had an auditing expert 
were associated with lower spending on internal auditing. These findings are interesting 
because they suggest that different types of monitoring can act as substitutes, instead of 
complements. The data in Barua et al. (2010) are from the pre-SOX period. Recognizing 
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that the environment of governance changed significantly post-SOX, Abbott et al. (2010) 
examine the association between audit committee characteristics and the resources 
allocated to internal audit, based on a survey of 134 chief internal auditors from Fortune 
1000 firms. Abbott et al. (2010) find that audit committees that have a greater oversight 
role over the internal audit function allocate a larger proportion of the internal audit hours 
towards internal controls.  
Thus, prior studies have examined many issues related to the interaction between 
audit committees and internal auditing. Overall, the evidence from prior studies suggests 
that audit committee characteristics, such as the composition of the committee, are 
associated with the quality of the committee’s interaction with internal auditing.    
 
Research Question 
 The audit formula is: Audit Risk = Inherent Risk x Control Risk x Detection Risk 
(AICPA 1983). Auditing Standard [AS] No. 8 (PCAOB 2010) notes that the risk of 
material misstatement consists of inherent risk and control risk. Thus, if the risk of 
material misstatement (i.e., IR x CR) increases, the auditor will attempt to have a lower 
level of detection risk. AS No. 8 also notes that inherent risk and control risk “are related 
to the company, its environment, and its internal control.”  
 Audit committees constitute an important element of the control environment of a 
company. Hence, when there is a change in the audit committee chair, it is likely that the 
auditor’s assessment of the control environment will change. This in turn will lead to a 
change in the assessed risk of material misstatement and, hence, detection risk. AS No. 8 
also notes that detection risk is “influenced by both the effectiveness of the substantive 
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procedures and their application by the auditor.”  Hence, lower levels of detection risk 
require higher levels of effort by the auditor.   
 When there is a change in audit committee chair, the auditor is dealing with a new 
person in that role. Unfamiliar situations generally increase the perception of risk, so a 
new audit committee chair can be expected to be associated with a higher risk assessment 
by the external auditor.  This, in turn, should lead to more audit work being performed 
after the fiscal year end when there is a change in audit committee chair—which, in turn, 
suggests that the audit report lag should be higher following a change in the audit 
committee chair. 
 Thus, the research question for the second part of the dissertation is: 
RQ2:  Is there an association between audit report lag and the change in audit committee 
chair?   
 
Method 
The following regression model is used to test the second research question: 
SqrtLag = β0 + β1*ExtraOrdinary + β2*SqrtSeg + β3*Foreign + β4*HiGrowth                   
+ β5*HiLitigation + β6*HiTech + β7*ZScore + β8*Loss + β9*GCOpinion         
+ β10*Ln(TotalAssets)  + β11*ACCC +  ε (3) 
 
SqrtLag = β0 + β1*ExtraOrdinary + β2*SqrtSeg + β3*Foreign + β4*HiGrowth                   
+ β5*HiLitigation + β6*HiTech + β7*ZScore + β8*Loss + β9*GCOpinion         
+ β10*Ln(TotalAssets)  + β11*BD + β12*NM + ε   (4) 
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In addition, the followings changes model regression model is also used test the second 
research question: 
ΔSqrtLag = β0 + β1*ΔExtraOrdinary + β2*ΔSqrtSeg + β3*ΔForeign + β7*ΔZScore           
+ β8*ΔLoss + β9*ΔGCOpinion + β10*ΔLn(TotalAssets)  + β11*ΔACCC +  ε  
   (5) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
SqrtLaq = Square root of the number of days between fiscal year-end and the 
date of the audit report; 
 ExtraOrdinary = 1 if extraordinary items in the financial statements, 0 otherwise; 
 SqrtSeg = Square root of the number of segments; 
 Foreign = I if company has foreign operations, 0 otherwise;   
 HiGrowth = 1 if company is in high growth industry, 0 otherwise; 
 HiLitigation = 1 if company is in high litigation industry; 0 otherwise; 
 HiTech =  1 if company is in high technology industry, 0 otherwise; 
 ZScore =  Probability of bankruptcy using Zmijewski’s model; 
 Loss = 1 if company has a loss before extraordinary items, 0 otherwise; 
 GCOpinion = 1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion, 0 otherwise; 
Ln(TotalAssets) = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
 ACCC = 1 if there was a change in the Audit Committee Chair, 0 otherwise; 
 BD = 1 if new audit chair was previously a member of the board either in 
the audit committee or some other capacity, 0 otherwise; 
 NM = 1 if new audit chair was previously not a member of the board, 0 
otherwise; 
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 Δ = 2009 data – 2007 data 
 
Sample 
 The sample to examine the second research question is similar to that used for the 
first research question. As before, I started with the 2009 Corporate Library Company 
Data file and have a sample of 1,832 companies for which director information was 
available. Note that for the second research question, there were 141 companies in which 
the z-score could not be calculated due to missing data. After deleting these and other 
observations due to missing values, the final sample is 1,618 companies for the audit 
report lag model. 
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression 
model.  The mean audit report lag for the sample companies is 63.1 days while the 
median is 59 days.  The mean and median of total assets are $512 million and $77 
million, respectively.  The distribution for total assets appears to be highly skewed, so 
consistent with prior research, the natural logarithm is used to transform total assets.  
About 21 percent of the companies reported extraordinary items in their financial 
statements. About one-third of the companies were in high-growth and high-tech 
industries, while 42 percent of the companies were in high litigation industries.  About 40 
percent of the companies reported a loss before extraordinary items.  
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Regression Results 
 The regression results using Sqrt(Lag) as the dependent variable and ACCC as the 
variable of interest are presented in the first three columns of Table 5 (Model 3).  The 
variables Loss, GCOpinion, and LN(TotalAssets) are significant (p < 0.001) while other 
variables are not being significant including ACCC (p = 0.901). The model has an 
adjusted R2 of 25 percent, in line with those reported in other recent studies (e.g., 
Krishnan and Yang 2009; Tanyi et al. 2010).   
 The last three columns of Table 5 present the results for Model 4. In this 
regression Sqrt(Lag) is the dependent variable while BD, and NM are the variables of 
interest; the inferences from this regression are substantively similar to those for Model 4.  
 Overall, the variables of interest (ACCC, BD, and NM), which are the variables 
associated with the change in the audit committee chair are not significant (p > .05).  
These results indicate that audit report lag is not associated with the change in the audit 
committee chair regardless of their membership in the audit committee or board prior to 
being made chair.  
 The regression results for the changes model are presented in Table 7 (Model 5).  
The coefficients of Extraordinary (p = .031), ZScore (p < .001), Loss (p=0.001), and 
GCOpinion (p = .015) are significant.  ACCC, the variable of interest, is marginally 
significant (p = .066).   
 The inferences from the regression model that has Sqrt(Lag) as a dependent 
variable and BD and NM as the variables of interest (in lieu of ACCC) are substantively 
similar to those presented for the model that has ACCC as the variable of interest. Neither 
of the two variables of interest is significant in the levels model. 
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Summary 
 Audit report lag is defined as the number of days after fiscal year end for a 
company that the audited financial statements are filed with the SEC.  There is a 
significant body of research investigating the determinants of audit report lag.  However, 
prior literature has not examined the relationship between audit committee chair change 
and audit report lag.  The second part of the dissertation examines the role that the change 
in the audit committee chair has on a company’s audit report lag.  This research is 
especially relevant given the responsibilities that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has placed on 
audit committees in ensuring accurate and fairly presented financial statements that are 
sufficiently audited by an independent audit firm. 
 Using audit committee director data from the 2009 Corporate Library data, I did 
not significant correlation between the change in the audit committee chair and the audit 
report lag when using a levels model.  However, when using the changes model for the 
audit report lag, I find some evidence that the change in audit committee chair is 
associated with a longer audit report lag. 
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IV. AUDIT CHAIR CHANGE AND AUDIT QUALITY 
 
Motivation 
 The third part of the dissertation investigates the implications of audit committee 
chair change to audit quality.  Audit quality is a subject of interest for a number of 
stakeholders with our capital markets including investors, regulators, financial statement 
prepares, and the accounting profession.  Audit quality can be measured a number of 
ways, but two of the most common metrics are restatements and abnormal accruals.  Prior 
studies have found that restatements lead to significant losses to investors (GAO 2002; 
Dechow et al. 1996; Anderson & Yohn 2002).  Prior studies have also found economic 
benefits for firms lower discretionary accruals (Xie 2001) and higher cost of capital for 
firms with low accruals quality (Francis et al. 2005). 
 Prior studies have shown that audit quality is related to some characteristics of 
audit committees, such as their composition and diligence.  The third part of the 
dissertation adds to the body of research on the association between audit committees and 
audit quality by examining the significance of the role played by the audit committee 
chair in ensuring high quality financial reporting. 
  
Background 
 As noted in the earlier chapters, the long-held view of the SEC and legislators is 
that an effective audit committee is an important element in the corporate governance and 
financial reporting framework. In addition, both regulatory and legislative actions during 
the past two decades reflect the view that the composition of the audit committee can be 
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expected to influence the quality of financial reporting. Hence, it is not surprising that 
many prior studies have sought to examine if indeed there is an association between 
different dimensions of audit committee composition and various proxies for financial 
reporting quality. 
 Financial reporting quality is a construct that can be operationalized in multiple 
ways. While there is no one single measure that best captures this construct, prior studies 
have used the following proxies for financial reporting quality: abnormal accruals, 
restatements, and SEC enforcement actions.  
 I begin with a discussion of studies that have examined the association between 
audit committee composition and the quality of accruals. I then briefly summarize 
research related to the association between audit committee composition and (a) 
restatements and (b) SEC enforcement actions. In addition, I also discuss some studies 
that have used other approaches, such as experiments and interviews, to examine the 
impact of various audit committee composition related measures on both actual and 
perceived quality of corporate financial reporting.   
 
Prior Research 
Audit Committees and Accruals 
 Many recent studies have examined if various audit committee composition 
related measures are associated with abnormal accruals. For example, Klein (2002) uses a 
sample of S&P 500 firms and examines accruals for 1991-1993. She finds that in 
companies that did not have audit committees with solely independent directors, 
abnormal accruals are higher (when compared to companies with solely independent 
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directors on the committee). Bedard et al. (2004) examine data from 1996 and use a 
matched sample design; they find that the presence of a financial expert is negatively 
associated with discretionary accruals. In addition, they also find that earnings 
management is lower in those companies that had audit committees comprised of 
independent members. Yang and Krishnan (2005) examine the association between 
earnings management and several audit committee characteristics, using data from 896 
observations from the years 1996-2000. They find that the following audit committee 
director characteristics are associated with earnings management: number of outside 
directorships held by audit committee directors, extent of stock ownership, and average 
tenure of the audit committee directors. 
 While the above cited studies use data from the pre-SOX period, other studies 
have examined the post-SOX period. However, in such studies, the focus is on having 
different types of experts since variations in independence are less likely in the post-SOX 
period (given the requirements of SOX for audit committees to have solely independent 
directors). Dhaliwal et al. (2010) use a sample of 770 firms with available data during 
2004–2006, and find that the presence of accounting experts on the audit is positively 
associated with accruals quality. Further, accruals quality is positively related to 
accounting experts who (a) are independent from the firm, (b) hold low levels of multiple 
directorships, and (c) have a lower tenure in their firms.  
 
Restatements  
 The quality of financial reporting can also be measured by the number of 
restatements and internal control weakness disclosures. Abbott et al. (2004) examine 88 
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firms with annual financial statement restatements and a control sample of firms matched 
by industry, size, auditor types and listing. They find that the likelihood of a restatement 
is lower for those firms where the audit committee is comprised of fully independent 
members and/or includes at least one financial expert. They also find that companies that 
had active audit committees had fewer restatements compared to the control group. Their 
findings echo the recommendations of the BRC and others who have argued for 
independent audit committees, presence of at least one member with financial expertise, 
and more audit committee meetings—all of which lead to effective monitoring by audit 
committees.  Similarly, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) provide empirical evidence between 
audit committee composition and the likelihood of a misstatement. They examine 159 
U.S. public companies that restated their earnings in 2000 or 2001 and identify a sample 
of 159 firms that did not restate (control group).  They find that probability of a 
restatement is lower in companies where audit committees have independent directors 
with financial expertise.  
 Some audit committee directors serve on many boards and on many audit 
committees. This practice is called “busy boarding” and is frowned upon by activists and 
advocates of good-governance. While some argue that litigation and, perhaps more 
importantly, reputation-related concerns are sufficient to keep directors on their toes, 
opponents of “busy-boarding” argue that such practice stretches directors thin and hence 
lead to lower quality monitoring. Sharma and Iselin (2012) investigate the association 
between multiple-directorships of independent audit committee members and financial 
statement misstatements in the pre- and post-SOX periods. These authors find that there 
is a significant positive association between financial misstatements and multiple-
 55
directorships in the post-SOX environment, suggesting that independent audit committee 
members serving on multiple boards may be stretched too thinly to be effective in 
performing their monitoring responsibilities.  
 Another issue that has received attention from good governance advocates is 
director tenure. During the Enron hearings held by the U.S. Senate’s Committee on 
Governmental Affairs (U.S. Senate 2002) one of the issues that was raised was whether 
the audit committee directors had been on the audit committee for too long, and hence 
were too close to management. While some argue that increased director tenure leads to 
better knowledge of the company and perhaps contribute to enhanced monitoring, others 
argue that too long a tenure leads a director to become complacent (Vafeas 2003). 
Sharma and Iselin (2012) also find that a significant positive association between audit 
committee director tenure and financial statement misstatements, suggesting that the 
quality of monitoring declines when the audit committee includes directors with long 
tenures.   
 
SEC Enforcement Actions 
 McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) examine 51 companies with two types of 
financial reporting problems (SEC enforcement actions and material restatements of 
quarterly earnings) and compared them to those that did not have any financial reporting 
problems. The results indicate that companies that had problems did not have audit 
committees comprising solely of outside directors; in addition, problem companies were 
also more likely to have no CPAs on their audit committees compared to no problem 
companies.  
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 Abbott et al. (2000) examine 78 firms subject to SEC enforcement action and a 
control sample of 78 firms matched based on size, industry, time period and exchange. 
These authors find that SEC enforcement is less likely at firms with audit committees that 
both (a) have solely independent directors and (b) meet at least twice a year.  Similarly, 
Beasley et al. (2000) examine financial statement frauds by 66 companies in three 
industries (technology, healthcare and financial services), along with a matched control 
sample of clean firms.  The results show that independent and diligent audit committees 
are less likely in the fraud companies.   
 
Experimental Evidence 
 Some studies have used experiments to examine the effect of having different 
types of audit committee directors on the quality of financial reporting. DeZoort and 
Salterio (2001) conduct an experiment using 68 Canadian audit committee directors. In 
the experiment, respondents were asked about a dispute between the auditor and 
management involving a material accounting issue. The results indicate that audit 
committee members who are independent and possess prior audit experience will be more 
likely to advocate a “substance” approach in the dispute, and more likely to support the 
auditor in the dispute with management.  Krishnamoorthy et al. (2002) survey audit 
partners and managers about perceptions of financial reporting quality and audit 
committee effectiveness. Nearly half of the respondents replied that audit committee 
members did not possess the required financial knowledge to ensure high financial 
reporting quality. Many respondents expressed reservations about audit committee 
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support for auditors in disagreements with management about the appropriate accounting 
treatment. 
 In summary, prior studies have examined many different time periods and 
samples to examine the association between the composition of audit committee 
members and the quality of financial reporting. The evidence from such studies indicates 
that audit committee member characteristics (as measured by level of independence, 
presence of experts, number of meetings, presence of an audit committee charter etc.) has 
an impact on the quality of financial reporting.   
 
Research Question 
 As discussed in the above section, prior research related to audit committee 
composition has focused primarily on audit committee director independence and 
financial expertise. In addition, some studies have also examined other constructs such as 
audit committee director tenure and busyness.  
 The chair of the audit committee plays an important role in setting the overall tone 
of monitoring by the committee. The chair controls the agenda and, as such, has a 
significant influence over the functioning of the committee.  Yet, there is little empirical 
evidence about the association between changes in the chair of the audit committee and 
the quality of financial reporting. Given the call by Carcello et al. (2011) for additional 
research related to the role of the audit committee chair, I examine the association 
between change in audit committee chair and financial reporting quality in the third part 
of my dissertation. 
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RQ3:  Is there an association between financial reporting quality and the change in audit 
committee chair?   
 
Method 
 I first use the following regression models to examine the research question, with 
subsequent restatement of the financial statements as the dependent variable: 
Restatement  = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*ACExpert + β3* Leverage                         
+ β4*SpecialistAud + β5*Raise + β6*ACCC + ε (6) 
Restatement  = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*ACExpert + β3* Leverage                         
+ β4*SpecialistAud + β5*Raise + β6*BD + β7*NM + ε (7) 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 Restatement = 1 if restatement of financial reports, 0 otherwise; 
Ln(TotalAssets) = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
 ACExpert = 1 if audit committee has a financial expert, 0 otherwise; 
 Leverage =  Ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
 SpecialistAud = 1 if auditor is an industry specialist, 0 otherwise; 
 Raise =  Ratio of cash raised (stock plus debt) to total assets; 
 ACCC = 1 if there was a change in the Audit Committee Chair, 0 otherwise; 
 BD = 1 if new audit chair was previously a member of the board either in 
the audit committee or some other capacity, 0 otherwise; 
 NM = 1 if new audit chair was previously not a member of the board, 0 
otherwise; 
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 Next, I use the following regression models to examine the research question, 
with abnormal accruals as the dependent variable: 
 absPMAA = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*BM + β3*SGrowth + β4*ROA  
   + β5*OCF + β6*DE  + β7*OpCycle + β8*ACCC + ε (8) 
 absPMAA = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*BM + β3*SGrowth + β4*ROA  
+ β5*OCF + β6*DE  + β7*OpCycle + β8*BD + β9*NM + ε (9)  
 absPMAWCA = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*BM + β3*SGrowth + β4*ROA  
   + β5*OCF  + β6*DE  + β7*OpCycle + β8*ACCC + ε  (10) 
absPMAWCA  = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*BM + β3*SGrowth + β4*ROA  
+ β5*OCF + β6*DE  + β7*OpCycle + β8*BD + β9*NM + ε (11)  
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 absPMA = Absolute value performance matched total accruals; 
 absPMAWCA = Absolute value performance matched working capital accruals; 
Ln(TotalAssets) = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
 BM = Ratio of book value of equity to market value; 
 SGrowth = Sales growth; 
 ROA = Ratio of net income to total assets; 
 OCF =  Operating cash flow; 
 DE = Ratio of debt to equity; 
 OpCycle =  Natural logarithm of the length of the operating cycle;; 
 ACCC = 1 if there was a change in the Audit Committee Chair, 0 otherwise; 
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 BD = 1 if new audit chair was previously a member of the board either in 
the audit committee or some other capacity, 0 otherwise; 
 NM = 1 if new audit chair was previously not a member of the board, 0 
otherwise; 
 
Sample 
 The data collection for this part of the dissertation begins similar to the process 
used for the first two parts. Thus, I have of 1,832 companies for which Corporate Library 
director information was available. For the 1,832 companies, financial data was obtained 
from Compustat and audit related data was obtained from Audit Analytics.  There were 70 
companies with missing financial data resulting in a sample size of 1,762 companies.  
Due to missing data for values of the variables in the model, the final sample for the 
restatement analysis is 1,577 companies.  Similarly, the sample sizes for the performance 
matched total accruals and the performance matched working capital accrual models are 
1,414 and 1,397, respectively.  
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics for Restatements Model 
 Table 8 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression 
model with restatements as the dependent variable.  Ten percent of the sample has a 
subsequent restatement. The mean and median of total assets are $512 million and $77 
million, respectively.  ACExpert had a mean of 0.55, meaning a little over one half of the 
sample had ta financial committee member that was a financial expert.  SpecialistAud had 
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a mean of 0.24, which indicates that less than one fourth of the sample had an auditor that 
was an industry specialist.    
 
Regression Results 
 The logistic regression results using Restatement as the dependent variable and 
BD and NM as the variables of interest are presented in the first three columns of Table 9 
(Model 6, Model 7, and Model 8).  Ln(Total Assets) was significant (p < .05) with a 
negative coefficient.   None of the other control variables is significant at conventional 
levels.    
 Considering the variables of interest (BD and NM), which are the variables 
associated with the change in the audit committee chair, none is significant (p > .05 in 
each instance).  These results indicate that subsequent restatements are not associated 
with the change in the audit committee chair regardless of their membership in the audit 
committee or board prior to being made chair.  
 
Abnormal Accruals Regressions 
 The regression results for the models that have absPMAA (absolute value 
performance matched total accruals) and absPMAWCA (absolute value performance 
matched working capital accruals) as the dependent variable are presented in Table 11.  
The overall results of the regressions are significant (p = 0.001), and the models have 
adjusted R-squares around 18 percent.   
 Most of the control variables in the two models are significant and have the 
expected coefficient signs. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient of ACCC (which is 
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the variables associated with the change in the audit committee chair), has positive 
coefficient and is significant (P < .05) in both regressions. These results indicate that 
abnormal accruals (absolute value of performance matched accruals and absolute value of 
performance matched working capital accruals) are higher when an audit committee has a 
new chair.   
 
Summary 
 Prior research has used restatements (publishing corrected financial statements 
after original submission) or discretionary accrual quality (abnormal accruals) to assess 
audit quality.  A number or prior research have established a correlation between 
characteristics of audit committees and the possibility of restatements (Abbott et al. 2004 
and Agrawal & Chadha 2005) while others have shown that same correlation to abnormal 
accruals (Xie et al.2003, Bedard et al. 2004, Dhaliwl et al. 2006, and Carcello et al. 
2008). 
 The objective of my research was to examine the association between audit 
committee chair change as the audit committee characteristic and two measures of audit 
quality: restatements and abnormal accruals.  For the logistic regression model using 
restatements as the dependent variable, the results were not significant.  The regression 
model for both the absolute value performance matched total accruals (absPMAA) and 
the absolute value performance matched working capital accrual are significant, but 
contrary to expectations audit quality appears to be lower when  there is a change in audit 
committee chair. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The role of the audit committee in a publicly traded company has continually 
evolved from its early beginning when the concept of an audit committee was encouraged 
by the SEC in 1940 as a result of the McKesson and Robbins case. Such a focus on the 
audit committee continued during the late 1990’s when, through both actions and 
speeches, the former SEC Chairman called for greater audit committee independence. 
Subsequently, such focus on the audit committee was formally codified into law when the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in 2002.   
 Given such legislative and regulatory initiatives, there has been a spurt in 
empirical research related to audit committee composition. Specifically, prior studies 
have examined the effects of variations in audit committee composition on both the audit 
process and on various audit-related outcomes.  A number of prior studies have examined 
characteristics such as financial expertise, gender, composition, age, number of meetings, 
and backgrounds of audit committee members.  However, limited published literature 
exists that examines the role of the audit committee chair and the impact that that person 
has on the quality of the financial statement process.   
 My dissertation addresses this area of accounting research because the chair of the 
audit committee has an important role to play in setting the agenda for the committee and 
thus can influence the tone of the audit committee’s monitoring activities. Thus, the 
impact that the audit committee chair has on the financial statement process is more 
significant than not only other board of directors but also other audit committee members.   
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 The first part of my dissertation examines the association between change in audit 
committee chair and audit fees. Using data for 61,331 directors across 3,417 companies 
using the Corporate Library database, I find that the change in audit committee chair is 
significantly related to audit fees.  Specifically, audit fees are significantly higher when 
there is a change in audit committee chair.  This correlation also holds when extra 
granularity is added and the new chair has not been on the board before becoming the 
audit committee chair and also when the new chair was previously a member of the 
board.   
 The second part of the dissertation examines the association between the change 
in the audit committee chair and audit report lag.  The audit report lag was run with two 
different models: levels and changes.  The first audit report lag model used a variable that 
just examined the change in the audit committee chair while the second model added an 
extra granularity by using two variables to look as the prior role of the new audit 
committee chair (not a member of the board, or member of the board). While the overall 
regression is significant, I find that there is no association between a change in audit 
committee chair and the audit report lag when using a levels model. However, when 
using a changes model, I find that the change in audit committee chair is associated with 
an increase in audit report lag. 
 The third part of the dissertation examines the change in audit committee chair to 
audit quality.  Specifically, restatement and abnormal accruals are examined as a proxy 
for audit quality, which is consistent with prior research.  In the restatements model, I 
find that none of the variables used for the audit committee chair change (BD and NM) is 
significant at conventional levels.  In the abnormal accrual models, the change in the 
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audit committee chair was found to be significant (p < 0.01), but the positive coefficients 
indicate that accruals are higher when there is a change in audit committee chair. 
 In summary, my dissertation examines an important issue that has significant 
public policy implications. Overall, I find that changes in audit committee chair have 
impact on the auditing process.  
 As in any empirical project, there are many limitations. First, I only examine one 
year in my analysis. Future research can examine additional years to see if the results are 
time dependent. Second, due to data collection related constraints, my analysis focuses on 
the largest companies. Future research can examine smaller companies, and examine if 
the results differ for smaller companies that are subject to lower levels of monitoring by 
the analysts and the media. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
2009 Corporate Library Company Data File  3,417 
Less: 
 Foreign companies (173) 
 Fiscal year-end not 12/31 (12/25-1/6) (809) 
 Financial, insurance, and real estate companies (603) 1,585 
US Companies with FYE of 12/31 excluding Fin, Ins, RE Co.  1,832   
 
 
 
2009 Directors that were audit committee chairs   1,832 
Less: 
 Audit chairs in 2009 that were also audit chairs in 2008   (1,493) 
Audit chairs in 2009 that were not audit chairs in 2008   339  
 
Audit Committee Chairs in 2009 that were not Audit chairs in 2008 
     Audit chairs in 2009 but were not on the board in 2008  194 
     Audit chairs in 2009 that were on the board but not members  
          of the audit committee in 2008  37 
     Audit chairs in 3009 that were audit committee members in 2008 118  
Audit committee chairs in 2009 that were not audit chairs in 2008 339 
 
 
 
  
 67
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for the Audit Fee Models 
 
 
   25th  75th 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. percentile Median percentile 
 
Ln(AuditFees) 14.15 1.04 13.45 14.08 14.77 
Ln(TotalAssets) 18.30 1.80 16.98 18.16 19.52 
InvRecTA 0.21 0.17 0.07 0.17 0.30 
Foreign 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SqrtSeg 1.41 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.73 
CurrentRatio 2.56 2.52 1.13 1.81 2.97 
Loss 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Leverage 0.59 0.42 0.35 0.56 0.74 
Big4 0.85 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 
GCOpinion 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Initial 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ICW 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ACCC 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BD 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NM 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 
Ln(AuditFees)= Natural logarithm of audit fees; 
Ln(TotalAssets) = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
 InvRecTA = Inventory plus accounts receivable as a proportion of total assets; 
 Foreign = I if company has foreign operations, 0 otherwise; 
 SqrtSeg = Square root of the number of segments; 
 CurrentRatio =  Ratio of current assets to current liabilities; 
 Loss = 1 if company has a loss before extraordinary items, 0 otherwise; 
 Leverage =  Ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
 
 Big4 = 1 if the auditor is a Big 4 audit firm, 0 otherwise; 
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 GCOpinion = 1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion, 0 otherwise; 
 Initial =  1 if the audit engagement is the first year audit, 0 otherwise; 
 ICW = 1 if the firm has a material internal control weakness (disclosed  
   pursuant to SOX 404), 0 otherwise; 
 ACCC = 1 if there was a change in the Audit Committee Chair, 0 otherwise; 
 BD = 1 if new audit chair was previously a member of the board either in 
the audit committee or some other capacity, 0 otherwise; 
 NM = 1 if new audit chair was previously not a member of the board, 0 
otherwise; 
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Table 3 
Regression Results for the Audit Fee Models 
 
Model 1: 
 
Ln(AuditFees)  =  β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*InvRecTA + β3*Foreign + β4*SqrtSeg     
+ β5*CurrentRatio + β6*Loss + β7*Leverage + β8*Big4                         
+ β9*GCOpinion + β10*Initial + β11*ICW + β12*ACC + ε 
 
Model 2: 
 
Ln(AuditFees)  =  β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*InvRecTA + β3*Foreign + β4*SqrtSeg     
+ β5*CurrentRatio + β6*Loss + β7*Leverage + β8*Big4                        
+ β9*GCOpinion + β10*Initial + β11*ICW + β12*BD + β13*NM + ε 
 
 
 --------------- Model 1 -------------- --------------- Model 2 -------------- 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic p-value Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
 
Intercept 5.667 34.11 <0.001 5.68 34.01 <0.001 
Ln(TotalAssets) 0.408 44.95 <0.001 0.408 44.76 <0.001 
InvRecTA 0.355 4.47 <0.001 0.352 4.43 <0.001 
Foreign 0.495 17.96 <0.001 0.493 17.89 <0.001 
SqrtSeg 0.144 5.33 <0.001 0.142 5.29 <0.001 
CurrentRatio 0.004 0.75 0.454 0.004 0.75 0.456 
Loss 0.062 2.22 0.027 0.063 2.26 0.024 
Leverage 0.189 5.40 <0.001 0.190 5.41 <0.001 
Big4 0.334 8.68 <0.001 0.331 8.58 <0.001 
GCOpinion 0.069 1.04 0.301 0.069 1.02 0.306 
Initial 0.009 0.14 0.890 0.007 0.11 0.913 
ICW 0.401 5.28 <0.001 0.403 5.30 <0.001 
ACCC 0.103 3.12 0.002 
BD    0.132 2.79 0.005 
NM    0.080 1.87 0.061 
 ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- 
   n = 1,729   n = 1,729 
 Adjusted R2 = 0.741  Adjusted R2 = 0.741 
 ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- 
 
 
Note: P-values are tailed.  Variables are defined in Table 2. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for the Audit Report Lag Models 
 
 
   25th  75th 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. percentile Median percentile 
 
SqrtLag 7.88 0.93 7.48 7.68 8.43 
Extraordinary 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SqrtSeg 1.42 0.51 1.00 1.00 1.73 
Foreign 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
HiGrowth 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 
HiLitigation 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
HiTech 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ZScore -1.85 3.06 -3.31 -2.12 -1.01 
Loss 0.40 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
GCOpinion 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Ln(TotalAssets) 18.34 1.81 17.01 18.21 19.54 
ACCC 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BD 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NM 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 
 
SqrtLaq = Square root of the number of days between fiscal year-end and the 
date of the audit report; 
 ExtraOrdinary = 1 if extraordinary items in the financial statements, 0 otherwise; 
 SqrtSeg = Square root of the number of segments; 
 Foreign = I if company has foreign operations, 0 otherwise;   
 HiGrowth = 1 if company is in high growth industry, 0 otherwise; 
 HiLitigation = 1 if company is in high litigation industry; 0 otherwise; 
 HiTech =  1 if company is in high technology industry, 0 otherwise; 
 ZScore =  Probability of bankruptcy using Zmijewski’s model; 
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 Loss = 1 if company has a loss before extraordinary items, 0 otherwise; 
 GCOpinion = 1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion, 0 otherwise; 
Ln(TotalAssets) = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
 ACCC = 1 if there was a change in the Audit Committee Chair, 0 otherwise; 
 BD = 1 if new audit chair was previously a member of the board either in 
the audit committee or some other capacity, 0 otherwise; 
 NM = 1 if new audit chair was previously not a member of the board, 0 
otherwise; 
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Table 5 
Regression Results for the Audit Report Lag Models 
 
Model 3: 
 
SqrtLag = β0 + β1*ExtraOrdinary + β2*SqrtSeg + β3*Foreign + β4*HiGrowth                   
+ β5*HiLitigation + β6*HiTech + β7*ZScore + β8*Loss + β9*GCOpinion         
+ β10*Ln(TotalAssets)  + β11*ACCC +  ε 
 
Model 4: 
 
SqrtLag = β0 + β1*ExtraOrdinary + β2*SqrtSeg + β3*Foreign + β4*HiGrowth                   
+ β5*HiLitigation + β6*HiTech + β7*ZScore + β8*Loss + β9*GCOpinion         
+ β10*Ln(TotalAssets)  + β11*BD + β12*NM + ε 
 
 
 --------------- Model 3 -------------- --------------- Model 4 -------------- 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic p-value Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
 
Intercept 11.251 46.98 <0.001 11.197 46.36 <0.001 
Extraordinary 0.081 1.67 0.095 0.080 1.64 0.100 
SqrtSeg 0.049 1.20 0.229 0.053 1.29 0.199 
Foreign 0.088 2.02 0.044 0.090 2.08 0.038 
HiGrowth 0.105 2.39 0.017 0.102 2.33 0.020 
HiLitigation -0.109 -1.81 0.071 -0.105 -1.74 0.081 
HiTech -0.080 -1.29 0.197 -0.080 -1.29 0.198 
ZScore -0.009 -1.39 0.165 -0.010 -1.40 0.162 
Loss 0.244 5.57 <0.001 0.240 5.48 <0.001 
GCOpinion 1.172 10.90 <0.001 1.173 10.91 <0.001 
Ln(TotalAssets) -0.197 -15.21 <0.001 -0.195 -14.90 <0.001 
ACCC -0.006 -0.12 0.901 
BD    -0.078 -1.08 0.279 
NM    0.050 0.78 0.434 
 ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- 
   n = 1,618   n = 1,618 
 Adjusted R2 = 0.250  Adjusted R2 = 0.250 
 ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- 
 
 
Note: P-values are tailed.  Variables are defined in Table 4. 
Model 3 final sample size: 1,618 companies 
Model 4 final sample size: 1,618 companies 
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Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for the Audit Report Lag Changes Model 
 
 
   25th  75th 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. percentile Median percentile 
 
ΔSqrtLag -0.14 0.91 -0.30 -0.12 0.12 
ΔExtraordinary -0.04 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔSqrtSeg -0.08 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔForeign 0.03 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔHiGrowth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔHiLitigation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔHiTech 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔZScore 0.18 6.21 -0.33 0.10 0.69 
ΔLoss 0.12 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔGCOpinion 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔLn(TotalAssets) -0.01 0.44 -0.20 0.02 0.18 
ΔACCC 0.02 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 
 
ΔSqrtLaq = Square root of the number of days between fiscal year-end and the 
date of the audit report; 
ΔExtraOrdinary = 1 if extraordinary items in the financial statements, 0 otherwise; 
 ΔSqrtSeg = Square root of the number of segments; 
 ΔForeign = I if company has foreign operations, 0 otherwise;   
 ΔHiGrowth = 1 if company is in high growth industry, 0 otherwise; 
 ΔHiLitigation = 1 if company is in high litigation industry; 0 otherwise; 
 ΔHiTech =  1 if company is in high technology industry, 0 otherwise; 
 ΔZScore =  Probability of bankruptcy using Zmijewski’s model; 
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 ΔLoss = 1 if company has a loss before extraordinary items, 0 otherwise; 
 ΔGCOpinion = 1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion, 0 otherwise; 
ΔLn(TotalAssets) = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
 ΔACCC = 1 if there was a change in the Audit Committee Chair, 0 otherwise; 
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Table 7 
Regression Results for the Audit Report Lag Changes Model 
 
Model 5: 
 
ΔSqrtLag = β0 + β1*ΔExtraOrdinary + β2*ΔSqrtSeg + β3*ΔForeign + β4*ΔZScore           
+ β5*ΔLoss + β6*ΔGCOpinion + β7*ΔLn(TotalAssets) + β8*ΔACCC +  ε 
 
 
Variable   Coefficient T-statistic p-value  
 
Intercept   -0.173 -7.37 <0.001  
ΔExtraordinary   -0.115 -2.16 0.031 
ΔSqrtSeg   0.001 0.02 0.983 
ΔForeign   -0.073 -0.86 0.387 
ΔZscore   -0.192 7.50 <0.001 
ΔLoss   0.313 3.43 0.001 
ΔGCOpinion   0.333 2.44 0.015 
ΔLn(TotalAssets)   0.061 1.15 0.248 
ΔACCC   -0.075 -1.84 0.066 
 ------------------------------------------------  
     n = 1,636   
  Adjusted R2 = 0.047   
  ------------------------------------------------  
 
 
 
Note: P-values are tailed.  Variables are defined in Table 6. 
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Table 8 
Descriptive Statistics for the Restatement Models 
 
 
   25th  75th 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. percentile Median percentile 
 
Restatement 0.10 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Ln(TotalAssets) 18.41 1.80 17.13 18.26 19.63  
ACExpert 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00  
Leverage 0.60 0.42 0.37 0.57 0.74  
SpecialistAud 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Raise 9.46 503.54 -50.20 -1.04 27.44  
ACCC 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BD 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NM 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 Restatement = 1 if restatement of financial reports, 0 otherwise; 
Ln(TotalAssets) = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
 ACExpert = 1 if audit committee has a financial expert, 0 otherwise; 
 Leverage =  Ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
 SpecialistAud = 1 if auditor is an industry specialist, 0 otherwise; 
 Raise =  Ratio of cash raised (stock plus debt) to total assets; 
 ACCC = 1 if there was a change in the Audit Committee Chair, 0 otherwise; 
 BD = 1 if new audit chair was previously a member of the board either in 
the audit committee or some other capacity, 0 otherwise; 
 NM = 1 if new audit chair was previously not a member of the board, 0 
otherwise; 
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Table 9 
Logistic Regression Results for the Restatement Models 
 
Model 6: 
 
Restatement  = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*ACExpert + β3* Leverage + 
β4*SpecialistAud + β5*Raise + β6*ACCC + ε 
 
Model 7: 
 
Restatement  = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*ACExpert + β3* Leverage + 
β4*SpecialistAud + β5*Raise + β6*BD + β7*NM + ε 
 
 
 
 --------------- Model 6 -------------- --------------- Model 7 --------------
Variable Coefficient Chi-square p-value Coefficient Chi-square p-value 
 
Intercept -0.06 0.00 0.95 -0.02 0.00 0.98 
Ln(TotalAssets) -0.12 5.38 0.02 -0.13 5.52 0.02 
ACExpert 0.18 0.93 0.34 0.17 0.89 0.35 
Leverage 0.12 0.47 0.49 0.12 0.49 0.49 
SpecialistAud -0.29 1.69 0.19 -0.29 1.64 0.20 
Raise 0.00 1.75 0.19 0.00 1.81 0.18 
ACCC -0.39 1.84 0.17  
BD    -0.39 1.32 0.25 
NM    -0.37 0.60 0.44 
 ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- 
   n = 1,577   n = 1,577 
 Chi,sq. = 8.80, p = .21  Chi-sq. = 8.80, p = .26 
 Pseudo R2 = 0.008  Pseudo R2 = 0.008 
 ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- 
  
 
 
Note: Variables are defined in Table 8. 
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Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics for the Performance Matched Accruals Models 
 
 
   25th  75th 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. percentile Median percentile 
 
absPMAA 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.09 
absPMAWCA 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.09 
Ln(TotalAssets) 6.93 1.81 5.60 6.77 8.18 
BM 0.71 1.30 0.34 0.63 1.05 
SGrowth 0.12 0.36 -0.02 0.07 0.19 
ROA -0.08 0.28 -0.10 0.03 0.07 
OCF 3.44 12.95 0.00 0.50 2.12 
DE 1.77 6.76 0.41 1.05 2.23 
OpCycle 3.44 0.99 3.99 4.46 4.91 
ACCC 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BD 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NM 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 10 provides descriptive evidence about the variables used for the abnormal accruals 
analysis. The mean and median values of both of the abnormal accrual measures are in 
line with those reported in prior studies. The variables are defined as follows: 
 
 absPMA = Absolute value performance matched total accruals; 
 
 absPMAWCA = Absolute value performance matched working capital accruals; 
 
Ln(TotalAssets) = Natural logarithm of total assets; 
 
 BM = Ratio of book value of equity to market value; 
 
 SGrowth = Sales growth; 
 
 ROA = Ratio of net income to total assets; 
 
 OCF =  Operating cash flow; 
 
 DE = Ratio of debt to equity; 
 
 OpCycle =  Natural logarithm of the length of the operating cycle; 
 
 ACCC = 1 if there was a change in the Audit Committee Chair, 0 otherwise; 
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 BD = 1 if new audit chair was previously a member of the board either in 
the audit committee or some other capacity, 0 otherwise; 
 NM = 1 if new audit chair was previously not a member of the board, 0 
otherwise; 
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Table 11 
Regression Results for Performance Matched Total Accruals Models 
 
Model 8: 
 
absPMAA = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*BM + β3*SGrowth + β4*ROA  
  + β5*OCF + β6*DE + β7*OpCycle + β8*ACCC + ε  
 
Model 9: 
 
absPMAA = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*BM + β3*SGrowth + β4*ROA  
  + β5*OCF + β6*DE + β7*OpCycle + β8*BD + β9*NM + ε 
 
 
 --------------- Model 8 -------------- --------------- Model 9 -------------- 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic p-value Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
 
Intercept 0.090 6.11 <0.001 0.087 5.87 <0.001 
Ln(TotalAssets) -0.007 -4.76 <0.001 -0.006 -4.51 <0.001 
BM -0.002 -1.01 0.315 -0.002 -0.98 0.329 
SGrowth 0.042 6.42 <0.001 0.041 6.28 <0.001 
ROA -0.111 -12.00 <0.001 -0.111 -12.02 <0.001 
OCF 0.000 1.46 0.143 0.000 1.49 0.136 
DE 0.000 2.13 0.033 0.000 2.17 0.030 
OpCycle 0.003 1.41 0.159 0.004 1.49 0.136 
ACCC 0.019 3.02 0.003  
BD    0.009 1.13 0.259 
NM    0.032 3.48 0.001 
 ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- 
   n = 1,414   n = 1,414 
 Adjusted R2 = 0.092  Adjusted R2 = 0.178 
 ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- 
 
 
Note: P-values are two-tailed.  Variables are defined in Table 10.   
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Table 12 
Regression Results for Performance Matched Working Capital Accruals Models 
 
Model 10: 
 
absPMAWCA = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*BM + β3*SGrowth + β4*ROA  
  + β5*OCF + β6*DE + β7*OpCycle + β8*ACCC + ε  
 
Model 11: 
 
absPMAWCA = β0 + β1*Ln(TotalAssets) + β2*BM + β3*SGrowth + β4*ROA  
  + β5*OCF + β6*DE + β7*OpCycle + β8*BD + β9*NM + ε + ε 
 
 
 --------------- Model 10 ------------- --------------- Model 11 ------------- 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic p-value Coefficient T-statistic P-value 
 
Intercept 0.081 5.43 <0.001 0.077 5.19 <0.001 
Ln(TotalAssets) -0.006 -4.51 <0.001 -0.006 -4.26 <0.001 
BM -0.002 -1.23 0.220 -0.002 -1.20 0.230 
SGrowth 0.045 6.86 <0.001 0.044 6.71 <0.001 
ROA -0.124 -13.23 <0.001 -0.124 -13.23 <0.001 
OCF 0.000 0.97 0.330 0.000 1.01 0.314 
DE 0.000 1.91 0.056 0.000 1.93 0.054 
OpCycle 0.004 1.76 0.078 0.004 1.84 0.066 
ACCC 0.018 2.75 0.006  
BD    0.008 0.97 0.334 
NM    0.030 3.24 0.001 
 ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- 
   n = 1,397   n = 1,397 
 Adjusted R2 = 0.095  Adjusted R2 = 0.198 
 ----------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------- 
 
 
Note: P-values are tailed.  Variables are defined in Table 10. 
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